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ARTICLE
LOCAL OFFENSES
Brenner M. Fissell*
Criminal law is generally thought to exist within two jurisdictional levels:
federal and state. Neglected in the legal mind, and in legal scholarship, is
the vast body of criminal law promulgated by local governments. While one
should ask “what” is being criminalized by cities, towns, and villages, one
should also ask “how” these offenses are written. The offense-drafting
practices reflected in state criminal law have been extensively studied, but
this has never been attempted for local offenses. This Article undertakes that
task. After surveying a large number of local criminal codes, this Article
concludes that local offenses routinely fail to live up to modern drafting
standards—especially in that they usually lack a mens rea element (and thus
impose strict liability). While this is problematic in its own right, special
concern arises when there is an asymmetry between archaically written local
offenses and a state criminal code that has been updated to reflect modern
practice. In such a context, the home rule powers of the local government
have the effect of thwarting the advances in criminal law made at the state
level. This may be because of a reduced institutional competence of city
councils and town boards, but it may also be a deliberate choice. While the
primary aim of this Article is to unearth this phenomenon and describe its
implications, these implications can be seen as relevant for two significant
conversations in criminal law scholarship: the recent literature studying the
misdemeanor system and also the movement to “democratize” criminal
justice. In general, recognition of harmful local-state offense asymmetry
should temper the prolocalist optimism of both groups.
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Binder, for comments throughout various stages of this project.
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INTRODUCTION
When most Americans think about the lawmaking powers of city councils
or town boards, they probably think of “codes enforcement”—the colloquial
term for the trivial rules that dictate how we must tend to our houses, lawns,
and yards. At most, violation of these rules is usually thought to trigger a
ticket or a small monetary fine. In reality, though, local governments—even
the smallest village—possess vast powers to criminalize conduct and to
punish violators with months in prison or probation. The U.S. Department
of Justice’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Department in 2015 helped
to shine a light on this “shadow criminal law”1 and reported the following
observation: “Ferguson’s municipal code addresses nearly every aspect of
civic life for those who live in Ferguson . . . .”2
Moreover, recent scholarship regarding the misdemeanor criminal justice
system (both state and local) has emphasized the significant impact that the
1. This label is from Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal
Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
7 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/
03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP4R-4S5G].

2020]

LOCAL OFFENSES

839

enforcement of low-level offenses has on the lives of many citizens.
Alexandra Natapoff writes that, while misdemeanors have long been seen as
the “chump change” of the criminal justice system, unworthy of the attention
of scholars, activists, and reformers, the misdemeanor system is nevertheless
“enormous, powerful, and surprisingly harsh.”3 These offenses constitute 80
percent of the criminal cases in the United States.4
While the effects of the misdemeanor system (both state and local) have
recently received interest, scholars have yet to focus sustained attention on
the substantive criminal law created by local governments—the offenses that
“address[] nearly every aspect of civic life” in localities.5 Only one in-depth
treatment exists: a 2001 study by Wayne Logan.6 A significant achievement
of Logan’s article is to analyze the “dilemma of localism”7—the
simultaneous opportunity and threat presented by devolution of power to
smaller jurisdictions—in the specific context of criminal law. In particular,
there is a well-recognized threat of parochialism in criminalization decisions:
majorities become more powerful when they are more concentrated within
smaller jurisdictional boundaries, and they can use this power to punish the
conduct of disfavored minorities.8 Logan discusses various hypotheses that

3. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 2 (2018) (“Because the crimes
are small and the punishments relatively light in comparison to felonies, this world of lowlevel offenses has not gotten much attention.”).
4. Id.
5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., supra note 2, at 7.
6. See generally Logan, supra note 1. Logan’s work came at a time of intense debate in
local government law scholarship. The home rule movement’s trend in favor of increased
local power had been defended by scholars such as Gerald Frug in the early 1980s, Gerald E.
Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1108–13 (1980), who “emphasized
the progressive possibilities that local power, especially urban power, presented.” David J.
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257, 2331 (2003). A decade later,
localism received an influential critique from Richard Briffault, who argued that localism had
been hijacked by affluent suburbs to serve selfish and exclusionary ends. Richard Briffault,
Our Localism (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism:
Part I]; see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 2), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 349–56
(1990) (describing this argument for localism). Summarizing this tension around the same
time that Logan was writing, Roderick Hills concluded, “lovers of local government . . . are
going to have to make a tough choice between the direct political participation that local
governments facilitate and the social inequality and parochialism that local governments also
seem to promote.” Roderick M. Hills Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a
Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2011–12 (2000). Local power
allowed for increased democratic involvement and policy experimentation, but this power
could be directed towards nefarious (“parochial”) goals. Id.
7. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of
Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954 (2019).
8. “Localities . . . indulge in a marked tendency toward oppressive use of the criminal
sanction.” Logan, supra note 1, at 1449. He highlights the example of local criminal laws
targeting homosexual conduct and also those targeting the religious practices of minorities.
Id. at 1449–50. Perhaps the most well-known examples are the local vagrancy offenses that
were enforced against unpopular groups. Id.; see also RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION:
POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S, at 2–4 (2016)
(describing the variety of people who were subjected to local vagrancy laws); BERNARD
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 185
(2005) (discussing how vagrancy and disorderly conduct offenses, combined with “order
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might explain this,9 and he also notes the implications of local offenses for
criminal procedure.10
If Logan’s work can be characterized as raising issues related to the content
of local criminal laws, in this Article, I intend to address those relating to
their form. This Article aims not to assess what conduct is made criminal by
local offenses but the manner in which the offenses are drafted. Such a study
has never been undertaken. With nearly 40,000 local governments,11 one can
understand why. The risk of erroneous generalization may have deterred
many scholars in the past. Given the significant impact that local offenses
have on American life, though, it is imperative that more research be done.
Recognizing the limits that come with the vast sample size, I will avoid
empirical or statistical claims and instead offer qualitative observations of
identifiable trends.
The most important trend is this: many local jurisdictions draft criminal
offenses in what we can call an archaic form. As will be explained, the term
“archaic” is somewhat of a stand-in for pre–Model Penal Code offensedrafting methods, in which there was “a tradition of poor drafting” and
confusing or absent culpability requirements.12 This can be contrasted with
modern offense drafting, which reflects the values of “analytical clarity” in

maintenance” policing, transformed “the ‘losers’ of society” such as “hoboes, bums, [and]
winos” into “agents of crime and neighborhood decline”).
9. Logan, supra note 1, at 1451 (“[L]ocal legislators’ very proximity to disorder . . .
might make them prone to react punitively, and to indulge their own idiosyncratic standards
of decorum.”). Logan also suggests that the pathologies inherent in criminal lawmaking may
be exacerbated in local politics: “[T]he recognized political appeal of appearing tough on
crime and disorder might suggest an even greater influence in the local political arena,” he
notes, “the small scale of which might create a particularly conducive environment for
oppressive decisions.” Id. at 1452. Finally, Logan posits that the knee-jerk resort to
criminalization by localities might be explained as pragmatism due to their constrained
lawmaking powers; given localities’ “comparative paucity in available means of social
control,” the creation of a criminal offense is an “easily adopted and expedient (if crude)
method for the control of ‘dangerous classes.’” Id. at 1453 (quoting CHARLES LORING BRACE,
THE DANGEROUS CLASSES OF NEW YORK AND TWENTY-YEARS’ WORK AMONG THEM 28–29
(New York, Wynkoop & Hallenbeck 1872)).
10. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. L.J. 369 (2018).
Essentially, more criminal law—even local criminal laws covering trivial offenses—justifies
more police stops and more police searches. Logan, supra note 1, at 1439–40. This is
significant not only because of the intrusion on privacy and liberty that results but also because
the searches can yield evidence of far more serious crimes. Id. Logan writes that the arrest
and search for the trivial local offense can serve as “an investigative fulcrum to increase
criminal liability (sometimes radically).” Id. at 1442. In one case he cites, an arrest for a
municipal offense prohibiting the riding of a bicycle on a sidewalk resulted in a fifteen-year
prison sentence for illegal firearm possession. Id. at 1442 n.200 (citing United States v.
McFadden, 238 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2001)). Of course, the prosecutors never pursued the
municipal charge, and the defendant was never convicted of it. United States v. McFadden,
238 F.3d 198, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2001).
11. See Local Governments by Type and State: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/2012/formatted_prelim_counts_23jul2012_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W3LH-UT6Q] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
12. Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62
DUKE L.J. 285, 287–88 (2012).
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offense definitions and the rejection of strict liability.13 While these
categories can be largely viewed as historical in origin (relating to the
adoption, or not, of Model Penal Code-type practices), they contain enduring
normative content as well: clarity in offense definition, especially with
respect to mens rea requirements, facilitates post hoc adjudication of liability
and grading, while also constraining arbitrary discretion.14
The criminal offenses of localities, I found, often fall into the archaic
category. Most significantly, I observed that many—perhaps the majority—
of local offenses that I studied lacked textual culpability requirements.
Consider a few examples from the following localities:
Table 1: A Sampling of Archaic Local Offenses
Greenfield,
Missouri
Omaha,
Nebraska
Cincinnati,
Ohio

“It shall be illegal for any person to throw rocks or any
other substance or material at any person in the
municipality . . . .”15
“No person shall own, keep or harbor . . . any dangerous
dog or other dangerous animal without said dog or other
animal being confined . . . .”16
“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to be an employee
of a sexually oriented business in the city of Cincinnati
without a valid license.”17

These offenses allow for liability even absent a culpable mental state, and
their act elements are also very broad. The Greenfield offense, for example,
would cover an afterschool snowball fight. This would be a ridiculous
13. Id.
14. Thus, clarity and culpability in offense definition enhance criminal law’s function as
a “decision rule” but not necessarily a “conduct rule.” See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules
and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 656
(1984).
15. GREENFIELD, MO., CODE § 210.690 (2020).
16. State v. Ruisi, 616 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Neb. 2000) (quoting OMAHA, NEB., CODE § 6-105
(1980) (current version at OMAHA, NEB., CODE § 6-149 (2020))). The definition of “dangerous
dog” is then described in greater detail, but there is no requirement of the owner’s mens rea
with respect to the dangerousness once the dog fits the criteria. Id. at 26 (“Proof of prior
knowledge that the dog had dangerous propensities is not required, nor is proof of any criminal
intent required.”). A sentence of six months imprisonment and six months probation was
affirmed by the court. Id. at 26–27.
17. State v. Valentine, No. C-070388, 2008 WL 1758081, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18,
2008) (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE § 899-5(b) (2020)). The court reversed the
conviction due to erroneous instructions at the plea colloquy but also suggested in dicta that
the defendant’s attack on the strict liability interpretation of the statute was not meritorious:
We recognize the necessary existence of certain criminal strict-liability statutes. It
does not violate the common good or fundamental fairness to place the prohibition
of operating a sexually-oriented business without a license into this category, along
with a myriad of other strict-liability offenses such as speeding, driving under the
influence, and violating the many other licensing requirements for conducting
business in the city.
Id. at *2.
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application, but substantive criminal laws like this do not guide or constrain
an adjudicator so as to prevent that ridiculous application.
That local offenses are often written in the archaic form is interesting in its
own right, but the greater significance of this finding is that one must
consider that these archaic local offenses exist underneath (or alongside)
state criminal codes that are usually written differently. As will be discussed,
a majority of states (twenty-seven) have implemented culpability
presumptions enabling code-wide element analysis; these states, therefore,
have thoroughly “modern” offense-drafting practices.18 In this majority of
states, though, localities can and do promulgate archaic offenses. Important
concerns arise when there is this type of mismatch between local and state
offense-drafting practices.
Take, for example, an offense created by Kansas City, Missouri, that was
ultimately interpreted by the Supreme Court of Missouri.19 The city
promulgated the following offense:
Any person who shall in any way or manner hinder, obstruct, molest, resist
or otherwise interfere with . . . any member of the police force in the
discharge of his official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.20

The offense had no textual mens rea requirement, but the analogous state
offense required that the interference be “willful.”21 In the case reviewed by
the state high court, the defendant locked the door on officers who were
attempting a warrantless entry of her home in order to arrest her teenage son
(for cursing at them).22 The elimination of the state’s mens rea requirement
in the city’s offense foreclosed the defendant’s argument that she lacked
willfulness because she believed she had a right to exclude the officers.23
Asymmetry between archaic local offenses and modern criminal offenses
should be called “harmful asymmetry” because in these circumstances, the
home rule powers of local governments have allowed them to counteract the
states’ advances in criminal offense drafting. Broad, strict liability offenses
proliferate in these localities, and the result is that lawmaking authority is
effectively delegated to law enforcement. As William Stuntz observed in
another context, “[b]road criminal law . . . means that the law as enforced
will differ from the law on the books. And the former will be defined by law
enforcers, by prosecutors’ decisions to prosecute and police decisions to
arrest.”24 While efforts to modernize state criminal codes aimed to mitigate
this pathology by constraining official discretion with clear adjudication
rules (especially culpability requirements), local criminalization undoes this
mitigation.
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. Kansas City v. LaRose, 524 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. 1975).
20. Id. at 116 (quoting KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE § 26.35 (1967) (current version at
KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE § 50-44 (2020))).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 115.
23. Id. at 117–19.
24. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
519 (2001).
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While this Article is concerned mostly with the effects of harmful criminal
law asymmetry, and not its causes, two hypotheses are worth considering. It
may be that local offenses are drafted in the archaic form because of
institutional incompetence. Smaller populations, fewer attorneys and
legislative staff, and limited attention of outside experts may all contribute to
an overall reduced institutional competence of city councils and town boards.
In cases that cannot be explained by incompetence,25 an alternative cause
may be deliberate overbreadth. The locality aims to overdeter by producing
what Dan Kahan calls a “‘prudence of obfuscation’ . . . designed to induce
uncertainty and restraint among persons who seek to pursue undesirable
behaviors within the literal terms of legal rules.”26
As should be apparent, the primary goal of this Article is descriptive: to
unearth the existence of archaic local criminal law and to mark a contrast
with modern drafting practices prevalent in many state codes. A secondary
goal, though, is to note the implications of this observation for two
contemporary scholarly conversations.
The first body of literature, mentioned briefly above,27 aims to assess the
dimensions of the misdemeanor criminal justice system. We can call it the
“misdemeanorland” scholarship (after the name given to the system by a
Commentators writing about misdemeanorland
prominent book).28
emphasize, among other things, that the misdemeanor system often acts
lawlessly, with officials ignoring substantive criminal law.29 For example,
one scholar recounts that the South Bronx police routinely arrested
individuals for trespass while ignoring the requirement in New York law that
the individual be present “unlawfully.”30 If one incorporates harmful localstate asymmetry into this analysis, one sees that the observations of
misdemeanorland scholars are often compounded or worsened by local
criminal offenses. As discussed above, archaic offenses, especially those that
lack mental elements, provide textual license through their overbreadth for
unconstrained official discretion.31 Imagine that the New York City Council
created a local trespass offense lacking an “unlawfully” element or a mens
rea element—in other words, creating strict liability for “entering” or

25. These factors cannot explain the persistence of archaic offenses in large cities, such
as New York and Los Angeles, or in localities where the drafting appears to be deliberate. See
City of Dayton v. Dye, No. 9539, 1986 WL 12353, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1986)
(discussing a strict liability dog control ordinance and stating that “[l]ack of intent or
knowledge is not a defense to violation of this section”).
26. Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1501 n.30
(2008) (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—but Only for the Virtuous,
96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 129 (1997)).
27. See supra notes 3–4.
28. See generally ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND
SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018).
29. See infra Part V.A. I will not attempt to prove or disprove either hypothesis here and
raise them only for the purpose of discussion.
30. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1359 (2012) (citing
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 2012)).
31. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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“remaining” on certain property. In this case, the lawlessness exhibited by
the South Bronx police would be effectively ratified by the offense definition.
The phenomenon of archaic local offenses is also relevant for a second
important scholarly conversation: the movement to “democratize” criminal
justice.32 The “democratization” movement addresses the problem of
racialized mass incarceration and blames the current criminal justice
system’s “bureaucratic” prioritization of expertise and efficiency as creating
excessively punitive outcomes.33 This can be contrasted with the desires of
the general public, whose moral viewpoints—if allowed to have efficacy—
would result in greater leniency.34 A latent theme in the works of the
democratizers is a subsidiarity-type principle in which smaller governmental
units (even down to the neighborhood level) are preferable.35 Harmful
asymmetry between archaic local offenses and modern state offenses, it
seems, presents a counterexample to the larger claims of the democratizers.
When it comes to offense drafting, it is the larger state jurisdiction, informed
by expertise, that produces the superior criminal offenses. The smaller local
jurisdictions, more representative of the lay public, produce offenses that
allow for the harmful effects mentioned above.36 And all because of either
incompetence or deliberately punitive intentions.
More generally, the claims of this Article, if accepted, should serve as
cautionary tales. While scholars writing about misdemeanors and those
writing about democratization have different focuses, these two groups both
share an optimism about localism.37 The phenomenon of harmful asymmetry
should concern proponents of localism; it is evidence that in the context of
criminal offense drafting, the threat posed by localism is greater than the
opportunity.38
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I marks out and describes two
categories of offense drafting forms—archaic and modern—as well as the
purposes served by modern drafting methods. Drawing on past fifty-state
surveys, Part II assesses the American state-level jurisdictions, placing each
state into either the archaic or modern category. Part III offers the central
descriptive contribution of this Article: an analysis of local criminal codes
and offenses, with the conclusion that local offenses are often drafted in the
archaic form. In Part IV, a troubling scenario is described—a geographic
overlap, but legal mismatch, between archaic local offenses and modern state
offenses that both apply in the same place at the same time. The implications
32. See generally Joshua Kleinfeld et al., Policy Proposals: White Paper of Democratic
Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1693 (2017).
33. Id. at 1694.
34. Id.
35. See infra Part V.B.
36. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 274–79.
38. One might wonder whether localism has resulted in examples of “beneficial
asymmetry”—where a locality created modern offenses while the state remained stuck in an
archaic form. I do not deny that this is possible or that this phenomenon can be discovered
after a broader study of local criminal codes. However, I did search for beneficial asymmetry
but was unable to find it. I leave consideration of this possibility for another day.
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of this harmful local-state asymmetry are discussed, and two tentative causal
hypotheses are raised: reduced local institutional competence or deliberate
local overdeterrence through broad offense drafting. Finally, Part V draws
out the relevant implications of archaic local offenses and harmful local-state
asymmetry for important contemporary debates in criminal justice
scholarship. These include the recent literature addressing the misdemeanor
system, as well as the democratization movement.
I. MODERN AND ARCHAIC OFFENSE DRAFTING
Before describing the form of local criminal law, and also that of the state
criminal law under which it operates, it is important to lay out two categories
for future application. All efforts at categorization run the risk of
generalization, but with respect to criminal offense-drafting practices,
categorization is made easier by history. The development of American
criminal law leads one to conclude that at the most basic level, criminal
offenses have been written in two different styles, each characteristic of a
different era of legislation. While the distinction is primarily historical, the
history reflects a conceptual divide that still remains.
We can begin with history. Midway through the twentieth century,
American criminal law was in an underdeveloped state. Consider the
observation of Herbert Wechsler in 1956: “Viewing the country as a whole,
our penal codes are fragmentary, old, disorganized and often accidental in
their coverage, their growth largely fortuitous in origin, their form a
combination of enactment and of common law that only history explains.”39
As Darryl Brown writes, “[a] tradition of poor drafting plagued these [preWar] statutes, so they commonly employed multiple mens rea terms and
conduct-defining terms in the same offense” and were also “encrusted with
ill-defined common-law terms such as ‘malice aforethought.’”40 Even
serious offenses such as murder were not clearly defined by statute, leaving
judges to step in and fill in undefined terms with meaning drawn from older
common law.41
39. Herbert Wechsler, The American Law Institute: Some Observations on Its Model
Penal Code, 42 A.B.A. J. 321, 321 (1956) [hereinafter Wechsler, Some Observations]; see
also Herbert Wechsler, American Law Institute: II A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law,
45 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 524, 526 (1955) [hereinafter Wechsler, A
Thoughtful Code] (“As our statutes stand at present, they are disorganized and often accidental
in their coverage, a medley of enactment and of common law, far more important in their gloss
than in their text even in cases where the text is fairly full, a combination of the old and of the
new that only history explains. Often a larger, integrative impulse is reflected in the traffic
law than in provisions dealing with the major crimes for which the major sanctions are
employed.”).
40. Brown, supra note 12, at 287.
41. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097,
1100–01 (1952) (“They put an even larger challenge since we know in what large part their
grounds are accidental or fortuitous—an old decision deemed to be authoritative, the mood
that dominated a tribunal or a legislature at strategic moments in the past, a flurry of public
excitement on some single matter, the imitative aspects of so much of our penal legislation,
the absence of effective legislative reconsiderations of the problems posed.”); see Paul H.
Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW
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Thus, in 1951, the American Law Institute (ALI), “a nongovernmental
organization of highly regarded judges, lawyers, and law professors,” set out
to create a new, model code, the Model Penal Code (MPC).42 Wechsler was
chief reporter.43 According to historians of the MPC, Paul Robinson and
Markus Dubber, the ALI’s goals were to “simplify and rationalize the
hodgepodge of common law offense definitions.”44 This was accomplished
first by creating what is now known as “element analysis”—the approach by
which an offense is divided into discrete components for the purpose of proof
and judicial scrutiny.45 Moreover, the number of mental elements was
reduced to four, and each had a definition that courts could use.46 This
enabled each conduct, result, or circumstance element to be assigned a mental
state. Element analysis, combined with the new mens rea schema, worked to
enhance the clarity of offenses and to ensure that culpability was required.
Brown summarizes: the “two ambitions” of the project were “to bring
analytical clarity to the definition and interpretation of criminal statutes” and
to “reject[] strict liability for any element of a crime.”47
The MPC had a significant impact on the development of criminal codes
after its promulgation. Robinson and Dubber describe a “wave of state code
reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, each influenced by the Model Penal Code.”48
In total, they count thirty-four reforms influenced by it in some way.49 Even
critics of the MPC, such as George Fletcher, concede that it has had great
impact: “The Model Penal Code has become the central document of
American criminal justice.”50 However, if only thirty-four states were
influenced by the reforms, this means that many others ignored them. Draft
reforms that were explicitly considered by certain state legislatures after the
MPC were rejected in eight states,51 while other states appear to have simply
done nothing. Thus, the “fragmentary, old, disorganized and often

CRIM. L. REV. 319, 323 (2007) (“A typical American criminal code at the time was less a code
and more a collection of ad hoc statutory enactments, each enactment triggered by a crime or
a crime problem that gained public interest for a time.”).
42. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 41, at 323 (“When the institute undertook its work on
criminal law, however, it judged the existing law too chaotic and irrational to merit
‘restatement.’”).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 334.
45. Id. at 334–35.
46. Id. The mental states were purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. Id.
47. Brown, supra note 12, at 287 (footnote omitted).
48. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 41, at 320.
49. Id. at 326.
50. George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 3
(1998); see also Michael Serota, Proportional Mens Rea and the Future of Criminal Code
Reform, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1201, 1201 (2017) (“And it was due in large part to the
drafters’ success in addressing these problems that the second half of the twentieth century
witnessed a cascade of criminal code reform projects structured around the Model Penal
Code’s general mens rea provisions.”).
51. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 41, at 326 (“Draft criminal codes produced in other
states, such as California, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, and West Virginia, did not pass legislative review and may yet be revived.”).
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accidental”52 criminal laws criticized by Wechsler in 1956 were left largely
intact in many jurisdictions.53 History, then, does much work in explaining
how there is a rough division between two different forms of criminal law.
There is a conceptual distinction that is the product of this history,
though—it is the distinction between codes with offenses that facilitate
element analysis and those that impede it or render it impossible. The most
important feature of an offense in this regard is the clarity of the culpability
requirement for each objective offense element. The demand for an easily
discernable mens rea is in part a search for clarity as to what the law requires
in terms of culpability for each element, but it also has a substantive
component that goes beyond mere clarity and aims to protect innocent
conduct.54 As we saw, the perceived importance of clarity in culpability
requirements made culpability the centerpiece of the ALI’s reform effort.
Clear culpability requirements are most important in that they function as
a guide for judges and juries to determine ex post whether conduct gives rise
to criminal liability and, if so, for what grade of offense. These aspects of
offense definition increase the offense’s value as a “decision rule” or
“adjudication rule,” then, and not so much as a “conduct rule,” or a guide for
the average citizen to act in a certain way.55 Thus, when assessing whether
a criminal code “provide[s] a comprehensive and accessible statement of its
rules of adjudication,”56 Paul Robinson, Michael Cahill, and Usman
Mohammad ask first whether the offenses have clear culpability
requirements.57 These help to create robust adjudication rules that
52. Wechsler, Some Observations, supra note 39, at 3; see also Wechsler, A Thoughtful
Code, supra note 39, at 526 (“As our statutes stand at present, they are disorganized and often
accidental in their coverage, a medley of enactment and of common law, far more important
in their gloss than in their text even in cases where the text is fairly full, a combination of the
old and of the new that only history explains. Often a larger, integrative impulse is reflected
in the traffic law than in provisions dealing with the major crimes for which the major
sanctions are employed.”).
53. For this reason, near the beginning of the twenty-first century, George Fletcher did
not hesitate to call California’s criminal code a “19th century state code.” Fletcher, supra note
50, at 3.
54. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The contention that an
injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient
notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil.”).
55. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal
Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (distinguishing between the “rule articulation function”
of criminal law in which it “provide[s] ex ante direction to members of the community” and
the “adjudication function” in which it “must decide whether the violation merits criminal
liability and, if so, how much”); see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 14, at 630.
56. Robinson et al., supra note 55, at 12 (capitalization altered for readability).
57. Id. at 13 (“Without an exhaustive delineation of culpability requirements, the
relationship between those requirements, and the manner in which the requirements will be
applied to the rules of conduct, a criminal code has done only half its job: it has codified each
actus reus without any explanation of the corresponding mens rea necessary for criminal
punishment.”); id. at 14 (“The goal of uniformity in application requires that the code make
clear which seemingly different offenders merit punishment in equal measure and which
superficially similar offenders must be treated differently from one another. Similar cases
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“increase[] uniformity” across similar cases and counteract “unguided
discretion in decisionmakers, which can breed disparity in application and
create the potential for abuse.”58
In sum, historical efforts to reform the criminal law were motivated by a
desire to clarify the culpability requirements of offenses, thus enabling
element analysis and providing guidance for adjudicators while constraining
their discretion. These efforts had great impact on actual codes, but this
impact was not universal. The result is that the law today reflects a division
between criminal offenses with clear culpability requirements and those
without them. For this reason, we shall use the strength of a jurisdiction’s
adherence to the values of clarity and culpability as the litmus test for a larger
categorization—what we might think of as the general tenor of the
jurisdiction’s offense-drafting practices. Going forward, if a jurisdiction
reproduces the efforts of the ALI by creating a clear criminal law with
culpability requirements, it will be categorized as a jurisdiction with
“modern” offense-drafting practices. If it fails to do so, it will be categorized
as having “archaic” practices.
Of course, the MPC hardly seems modern at this point, and many opaque,
strict liability offenses may not be old at all. However, given the above
history, it makes sense to categorize jurisdictions in temporal or historical
terms—as those who made substantial efforts to reform and those who stayed
stuck with their traditional codes. These terms avoid the imprecision of the
labels “common-law states” and “Model Penal Code states.”59 “Substantial”
should be emphasized because no state adopted the MPC jot for jot, and the
thirty-four states that did promptly reform their codes in response to the MPC
fall along a spectrum in terms of adherence to its principles.60
must be treated equally, and different cases must be distinguished according to well-defined
principles . . . . Greater detail serves to confine the adjudicator’s discretion and focus her
attention on relevant considerations rather than allowing her to be swayed by unimportant
concerns.”).
58. Id. at 12.
59.
Few tropes in American legal teaching are more firmly entrenched than the criminal
law division between Model Penal Code (“MPC”) and common law states. Yet
even a cursory look at current state codes indicates that this bifurcation is outmoded.
No state continues to cling to ancient English common law, nor does any state fully
adhere to the MPC. In fact, those states that adopted portions of the MPC have since
produced a substantial body of case law—what this Article terms “new common
law”—transforming it.
Anders Walker, The New Common Law: Courts, Culture, and the Localization of the Model
Penal Code, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1633, 1634 (2011). Walker’s criticism of the “common law”
label seems to be that this gives the impression that the state’s criminal law is mostly judgemade and inherited from England, but it is not clear that the term is used in this way in the
casebooks he references. Id. at 1636–37. It may be that “common law” simply meant older
American interpretations of nebulous statutes—the target of the MPC’s reforms. Walker’s
criticism of the term “Model Penal Code state” is more significant, as this does give the reader
or student the impression that the MPC was adopted jot for jot. Id. at 1648. Walker urges
scholars and teachers to refer to what are normally called “common law” states as “indigenous
code states.” Id. at 1638.
60.
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II. THE FORM(S) OF STATE CRIMINAL LAW
We now have a working definition of two categories of criminal offensedrafting practices—archaic and modern—but have yet to apply these
categories to any contemporary jurisdictions. Before assessing the local
government jurisdictions that are the primary focus of this Article, it is first
necessary to lay the groundwork for comparison and contextualization by
describing practices amongst the states. Below, I classify twenty-seven state
jurisdictions as having modern criminal codes and twenty-four jurisdictions
(including Washington, D.C.) as having archaic criminal codes.
A. Modern Codes
As said above, a modern code for purposes of this Article is a code that
substantially reformed its criminal code in response to the MPC—most
especially by enhancing clarity with respect to culpability requirements that
were previously absent or confusing. The most important advancement of
the MPC in this regard was the requirement of element analysis, and the
crucial sections in this regard are subsections (3) and (4) of section 2.02,
which, respectively, establish a recklessness default for all material elements
and the transposition of any explicit mental element to all other material
elements.61 Without using the term “element analysis,” Wechsler himself
later reflected on these provisions as “invit[ing] attention to the wisdom of
such stark distinctions as to culpability respecting different elements of an
offense.”62 If a code has adopted the above provisions, it has been infused
with the most important advancement of the code reform movement—it can
be called “modern.”
While thirty-four states adopted portions of the MPC, no state adopted all of it. Even
states that adopted much of it—New York, Illinois, and Missouri are examples—
tended to amend MPC definitions with new legislation. Why? A brief look at the
archaeology of state codes indicates that those portions of the MPC that challenged
local, cultural values tended to fail, while those sections that simply reiterated what
many people already felt tended to succeed. This rendered so-called “MPC” states
hybrid regimes that enjoyed some of the modern innovations provided by the MPC,
yet retained distinctive aspects of older, more local law.
Id. at 1646; see also Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability
Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the
Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229, 229 n.2 (1997) (“Herbert Wechsler . . . in
1984 . . . asserted that since the Unofficial Draft was published in 1963, some 34 states had
enacted new penal codes. Wechsler concluded that all of these enactments were influenced to
varying degrees by the Model Penal Code, but acknowledged that some states had gone much
further than others in emulating the innovations found in the Model Penal Code.”).
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. L. INST. 1985) (“Culpability Required Unless
Otherwise Provided. When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an
offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely,
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”); id. § 2.02(4) (“Prescribed Culpability
Requirement Applies to All Material Elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes
the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without
distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the
material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”).
62. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model
Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1437 (1968).
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In choosing this as the focal point for the categorization, I begin with the
2012 study undertaken by Darryl Brown, in which he marks out a core group
of twenty-four states that have an “identifiable variation” of section 2.02(3)
and section 2.02(4); he uses this as the touchstone for whether or not a state
can be categorized as an “MPC state” (in our terminology, a “modern”
code).63 Brown includes the following states64:
Table 2: Brown’s MPC States
Alabama

Colorado

Indiana

Maine

Alaska

Connecticut

Illinois

Missouri

Arizona

Delaware

Arkansas

Hawaii

New
York
North
Dakota

New
Ohio
Hampshire
New
Kentucky
Oregon
Jersey
Kansas

Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

While Brown’s survey was invaluable in finding a baseline group of
modern states, I add two additional jurisdictions that he analyzed but did not
include: Montana and Washington. Brown explicitly considered whether or
not to include these in his typology but decided against it because the
jurisdictions’ culpability provisions strayed too far from MPC rules.65 For
purposes of this Article, though, they should be considered modern because
they nevertheless reflect requirements of element analysis.66 Finally, one
state must be added to Brown’s list because it reformed its code after his
study was complete: Michigan added MPC-type culpability presumptions
and definitions in 2015.67
63. Brown, supra note 12, at 294 (“I first reviewed all state criminal codes to identify
those that codify an identifiable variation of the MPC’s key interpretive rules and
presumptions regarding culpability requirements for elements of criminal offenses . . . .”).
64. Id. at 295 (citing code provisions).
65. Id. at 289 n.8 (“I exclude Montana’s code because it includes no version of MPC
§ 2.02(3) or § 2.02(4), even though it reflects MPC influence because its code requires at least
negligence ‘with respect to each element described by the statute.’ This negligence
requirement was adapted from MPC § 2.02(1) and § 2.05. Washington is also excluded
because its code lacks any reference to the MPC’s mens rea presumptions, although its
definitions of culpability terms track the MPC.” (citations omitted) (first quoting MONT. CODE.
ANN. §§ 45-2-103, 45-2-104 (2011); and then quoting WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010
(2009))).
66. Id. Montana’s reduction of the default from recklessness to negligence is a significant
departure from the MPC but still requires element analysis. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103
(2020). Washington’s omission of any mens rea presumption is more significant, but my study
of Washington’s code shows that element analysis is baked into almost all of the specific
offenses. These offense definitions accomplish what the presumptions do not. See, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.010 (2020) (adopting mental states that very closely resemble
MPC mental states); id. § 9A.36.011 (“A person is guilty of assault in the first degree if he or
she, with intent to inflict great bodily harm: (a) Assaults another with a firearm or any deadly
weapon or by any force or means likely to produce great bodily harm or death . . . .”).
67. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.9 (2020).
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The adoption of the key interpretive principles of element analysis, though,
serves as but a proxy for the larger state of the jurisdiction’s code. When one
looks at individual offenses in the above twenty-seven modern jurisdictions,
they mostly conform to the good drafting practices discussed above: clear,
discernible elements and a mental element somewhere to be found.68
Consider an offense representing the core of the concerns of criminal law—
physical assault (sometimes called battery)—and note how this offense is
defined in a sampling of the modern states (the lowest grade of the offense is
excerpted):
Table 3: A Sampling of Modern Assault Statutes

Arizona

Illinois

New
Jersey

Oregon

“A person commits assault by: 1. Intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causing any physical injury to another person; or 2.
Intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension
of imminent physical injury; or 3. Knowingly touching another
person with the intent to injure, insult or provoke such person.”69
“A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal
justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an
individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or
provoking nature with an individual.”70
“A person is guilty of assault if the person: (1) Attempts to cause
or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another; or (2) Negligently causes bodily injury to another with
a deadly weapon; or (3) Attempts by physical menace to put
another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”71
“A person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree if
the person: (a) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
physical injury to another; (b) With criminal negligence causes
physical injury to another by means of a deadly weapon; or (c)
With criminal negligence causes serious physical injury to
another who is a vulnerable user of a public way . . . by means
of a motor vehicle.”72

68. Note that I say only that a mental element is found somewhere—not that it is present
with respect to every material element. The requirement of a mental element for all material
objective elements was a goal of the MPC drafters, yet Brown notes that even in his cohort of
MPC states, this requirement has been undercut by judicial interpretations by state high courts.
Brown, supra note 12, at 300. Thus, in MPC states, one can only be assured of the fact that
“pure” strict liability offenses would be invalid. See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict
Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1081 (1997) (labeling an
offense without any mental elements a “pure” strict liability statute). This guarantee should
not be taken lightly, though: it means that conduct that is undertaken with a wholly innocent
mental state cannot be criminally punished. It would invalidate, for example, Florida’s widely
criticized drug possession statute. See FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (2020); State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d
412 (Fla. 2012) (holding section 893.13 to be constitutional).
69. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1203 (2020).
70. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3 (2020).
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West 2020).
72. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.160 (2020).
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While only New Jersey’s offense adopts language identical to that of the
MPC’s assault offense,73 the other three states all bear the markings of the
MPC’s element analysis approach. Different objective elements are cleanly
differentiated, and the mental element applicable to each is unambiguous.
There is no outmoded language.
As this exercise shows, within the core offenses,74 modern code states
write their offenses using the modern form, paying attention to the values of
clarity and culpability, even if they modify its exact text.
B. Archaic Codes
That we have counted only twenty-seven jurisdictions with modern
offense-drafting practices, though, is a clue that the remaining states likely
write criminal laws differently. As mentioned above, the code reform efforts
in the twentieth century were not universally successful, leaving the old
criminal law on the books in many jurisdictions.75
For this reason, I categorize the remaining twenty-four jurisdictions as
those that maintain a code with offenses drafted in the archaic form. This is
partly historical, as just mentioned, but also conceptual. Since the status quo
in American criminal law was an offense-drafting practice that failed to
enhance the values of clarity and culpability, the failure to participate in the
code reform movement during the mid-twentieth century means that these
nonparticipating jurisdictions have many unclear offenses with confusing or
absent culpability requirements. As Judge Gerard Lynch observed, “the

73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
74. This claim is less true with respect to the ad hoc creation of offenses outside of the
core code. As observed by Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill in multiple articles written from
2000 to 2010, “the decades since the wave of Model Code-based codifications have seen a
steady degradation of American codes brought on by a relentless and accelerating rate of
criminal law amendments that ignore the style, format, and content of the existing codes.”
Paul H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An
Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709, 709 (2010); see
also Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States
from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson & Cahill,
Model Penal Code Second] (“This degradation process has several sources. One is specialinterest-group lobbying . . . . Another engine of code degradation is the normal newsstory/political-response cycle. A high-profile series of offenses, or even one particularly
serious offense, upsets the community. The legislators, understandably, feel that they need to
demonstrate their appreciation of the community concern and to do something in response to
it.”); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 634 (2005) (“The main form of degradation is the
proliferation of numerous new offenses that duplicate, but may be inconsistent with, prior
existing offenses.”); Robinson et al., supra note 55, at 2. As new ad hoc criminal offenses are
created for various reasons at various times, the MPC-based code becomes less and less
representative of the state of criminal law in the jurisdiction—just as “barnacles collecting on
the hull of a ship” can at some point “dwarf[] the ship.” Robinson & Cahill, Model Penal Code
Second, supra, at 172. Robinson and Cahill’s observations are significant, however, for the
purposes of comparison of codes: even the barnacle-encrusted ship of the modern states seems
better than a ship entirely composed of barnacles.
75. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions that failed to adopt the MPC in its heyday have the worst and
most confusing codes today.”76 These twenty-four jurisdictions are:
Table 4: Archaic Code States
California
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Iowa
Louisiana

Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada

New Mexico
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

Vermont
Virginia
Washington, D.C.
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Repeating the exercise above, it is revealing to look at the assault or battery
offense in a sampling of these jurisdictions:
Table 5: A Sampling of Archaic Assault Statutes
“A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another.”77
“‘Assault’ means the crimes of assault, battery, and
Maryland
assault and battery, which retain their judicially
determined meanings.”78
“Whoever commits an assault or an assault and battery
Massachusetts
upon another shall be punished by imprisonment . . . .”79
“[E]very person who shall make an assault or battery or
Rhode Island
both shall be imprisoned . . . .”80
California

In these sample states, unlike those sampled in the modern code group,
very little work is done to define the offense in terms of discrete elements or
to assign a culpability element. Massachusetts and Rhode Island make no
effort to define the words “assault” or “battery,” presumably leaving this to
judicial interpretation, while Maryland delegates this to the judiciary
explicitly.81 California defines battery in more detail; however, this offense
lacks the precision of the modern states mentioned earlier and uses the
imprecise term “willful.”82 The requisite mens rea is unclear.
76. Gerard E. Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 219, 224 (2003).
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 2020).
78. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-201(b) (LexisNexis 2020).
79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13A (2020).
80. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-3 (2020).
81. Maryland is known as a state that retains a number of common-law crimes. See Carissa
Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 981–82 (2019)
(listing fifteen states “that recognize the common law authority of judges to convict for
conduct that is not criminalized by statute”).
82. An attempt to find judicial elaboration of the “willfulness” requirement also leads one
to unsatisfying results. See People v. Pinholster, 824 P.2d 571, 622 (Cal. 1992) (appearing to
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A substantial minority of American state-level jurisdictions, then, can be
said to have archaic offense-drafting practices. In these twenty-four states,
the code reform effort in the mid-twentieth century was ignored or failed to
achieve legislative approval after it was considered. What remained was the
product of history—a criminal law whose form did not prioritize the values
of clear culpability requirements.
III. THE FORM(S) OF LOCAL CRIMINAL LAW
Now that we have a better understanding of the form of offense drafting in
state-level criminal codes, we may turn to the central subject of this Article:
the form of local offenses. Such a study has never been done,83 despite the
vast reach of this law and the significance of it to the daily lives of nearly all
Americans.
A. The Authority to Create Local Crimes
Before looking at a number of criminal codes and offenses created by
localities, it is worth briefly discussing the state constitutional law that gives
these localities the power to create crimes. As the U.S. Supreme Court
observed in United States v. Lopez,84 “[s]tates historically have been
sovereign” in “areas such as criminal law enforcement.”85 Part of this
sovereignty, though, has been delegated to inferior intrastate governments—
what most scholars call localities.86 Just as “federalism” describes the
devolution of political power to the state governments vis-à-vis the federal
government, “localism” describes state law devolution of lawmaking power
to villages, cities, towns, and counties.87 As we will see, in the vast majority
of states, this includes the power to criminalize conduct. This was not always
so prevalent.
Historically, states jealously guarded their lawmaking power against
localities. The predominant position in state constitutional law during the
latter half of the nineteenth century was the so-called “Dillon’s Rule”:
localities were mere creatures of the state and could be abolished or altered
by the state at will.88 This position was enshrined as a matter of federal
constitutional law in the 1907 Supreme Court case Hunter v. Pittsburgh89:
read willfulness as meaning merely harmful or offensive touching and thus rendering the
requirement superfluous with the act element); see also People v. Shockley, 314 P.3d 798, 803
(Cal. 2013) (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reading Pinholster in the
manner just described).
83. Wayne Logan’s assessment of the local criminal law focused on the substantive
conduct that was criminalized and its procedural effects. See supra notes 8–10. Moreover,
Logan’s study appears to have focused on local criminal laws that were litigated in state courts,
Logan, supra note 1, at 1426–28, 1426 nn.87–121, but this of course misses many laws that
are simply “on the books”—or do not yield appellate case law.
84. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
85. Id. at 564.
86. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 6.
87. Id. at 1.
88. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1122 (2007).
89. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
State as may be entrusted to them . . . . The number, nature and duration of
the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.90

According to this anemic view of local political power, criminal punishment
was beyond the power of localities—at least unless it was expressly granted
by statute.
Starting in the late nineteenth century, though, Dillon’s Rule was
challenged. The emergence of so-called “home rule” by localities meant that
some state constitutions granted municipal governments “permanent
substantive lawmaking authority.”91 These early forms of home rule are now
known as “imperio” home rule regimes, where local power is insulated from
state legislative curtailment so long as it touches only local (and not
“[M]any early home-rule regimes established
statewide) matters.92
essentially separate—and exclusive—sovereigns,” writes Paul Diller,
“whose areas of authority did not overlap.”93 The consensus at the time,
though, was that criminal law was not a local concern. As David Barron
notes, a leading treatise writer and home rule advocate of the time, Howard
Lee McBain, included criminal law in a list of nine powers “so obviously
outside the sphere of local affairs that not even the cities themselves claimed
to possess them.”94
In the decades immediately following World War II, home rule reformers
continued to successfully press for greater and greater lawmaking power for
localities.95 This next wave of laws, known as “legislative home rule,”
flipped the presumption of Dillon’s Rule: they granted a presumption of
general legislative authority to localities, subject to express limitations
imposed by the state legislatures.96 Localities could engage in lawmaking
that was not bounded by subject matter or local concern, but in turn, they lost
immunity from state law preemption in the areas they legislated in under an
imperio regime. As Richard Briffault writes, “[t]he rise of the legislative
home rule model . . . trades away all immunity in order to assure greater

90. Id. at 178.
91. Diller, supra note 88, at 1124.
92. Id. at 1124–25.
93. Id.
94. Barron, supra note 6, at 2306; see also id. at 2305 n.185 (referring to these powers as
the “McBain’s Nine”). But see Logan, supra note 1, at 1414 (“The local power to criminalize
is neither new nor novel; since colonial times localities have wielded considerable power to
legislate against perceived forms of social disorder in tandem with, and very often independent
of, state government.”). Logan’s evidence for this historical pedigree is an impressively
researched list of state cases, the oldest of which was decided in 1909. Id. at 1425–28. It may
be that the treatise writer, writing those words in 1916, was generalizing about the state of the
law in past decades and that this status quo was beginning to change. In any event, the question
of the precise birthdate of local crimes in American law must be put off for another day.
95. Diller, supra note 88, at 1125.
96. Id. at 1125–26.
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scope to local initiative.”97 In legislative home rule states, localities are free
to punish violations of their ordinances as criminal offenses absent an explicit
restriction by the legislature.
The current state of the law shows a mix of the above forms. The most
recent fifty-state survey, conducted by Daniel Rodriguez and Lynn Baker in
2009, reveals the following general breakdown98: (1) Five states have no
home rule,99 (2) Twenty-three states have imperio home rule,100 and (3)
Twenty-three states have legislative home rule.101
Local crimes can now be found in all three categories. Alabama, which is
listed as a non-home rule state by Rodriguez and Baker, nevertheless contains
municipalities that punish a range of offenses because state law empowers
them to “adopt ordinances and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of
the state.”102 Birmingham, for example, incorporates by reference many
state offenses but also created its own ordinance punishing domestic violence
more specifically.103 Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a city in an imperio home rule
state, punishes disorderly conduct more severely than does the state.104 In
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, a city in a legislative home rule state, only a small
number of offenses are punished criminally, including, for example, the
failure of antique jewelry sellers to maintain a log of their items.105
Local criminal law proliferates, then, but its basis in state constitutional
law will depend on the jurisdiction. But what does this law look like? How
are these offenses written? It is to this central question that we now turn.
B. A Note on Method
A thorough analysis of all local criminal codes is practically impossible.
First, there is the primary obstacle: numerosity. The last U.S. Census in
2012 revealed 38,917 general purpose local governments in the United
States.106 These included 3031 county-type governments, 16,364 town-type

97. Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 28
(2006).
98. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial
Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1338–39, 1338 nn.10–12 (2009).
99. Id. at 1338 n.10. However, Nevada appears to have granted a limited home rule after
Baker and Rodriguez’s study. See NEV. ASS’N OF CNTYS., LIMITED FUNCTIONAL HOME RULE
(2015),
http://www.nvnaco.org/wp-content/uploads/NACO-Home-Rule-White-Paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89M5-VNTC].
100. Baker & Rodriquez, supra note 98, at 1339 n.12.
101. Id. at 1339 n.11.
102. ALA. CODE § 11-45-1 (1975).
103. BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CODE § 11-2-8 (1999).
104. See City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 661 So. 2d 445, 447 (La. 1995) (providing the
language of the city ordinance and the state statute). The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld
this ordinance against a preemption claim because the state constitution explicitly marked out
the punishment of felonies as a matter of statewide concern but not the punishment of
misdemeanors. Id. at 450.
105. MURFREESBORO, TENN., CODE §§ 21-82, 21-84 (2016).
106. See Local Governments by Type and State: 2012, supra note 11. This does not count
“special purpose” districts such as school and water districts, which were 50,087 in number.
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governments, and 19,522 municipal or city-type governments.107 Even a
random sampling of these approximately 40,000 governments would yield a
number of codes far too large to analyze.108 Moreover, since criminal codes
are themselves composed of many different criminal offenses—each which
may be written differently from another—the more relevant statistical
observation would be the counting and categorization of individual offenses.
This would then mean that the dataset to study would be many, many times
more than the approximate 40,000 mentioned above.
Scholars facing such a daunting obstacle could give up and say nothing
about the phenomenon. The current dearth of attention paid to local criminal
law may be due to a choice on the part of many to take this path, avoiding
analysis of a vast body of law for fear of making erroneous
generalizations.109 But this is unsatisfying. Precisely because of this law’s
vastness, it also affects the lives of hundreds of millions of people in
important ways.
Fortunately, there is another response. Researchers can aim to say
something that is not “statistical” or comprehensive but instead engage in a
descriptive endeavor through the use of examples and representative cases.
The scholars at the forefront of the burgeoning new literature on the
misdemeanor criminal justice system (both state and local) help illustrate this
approach; faced with a similar problem of numerosity and vastness, they
nonetheless press on with their research. One method, taken by Issa KohlerHausmann (and earlier by Malcolm Feeley), is to intensely study one
jurisdiction with the expectation that observations about that jurisdiction will
be largely true of others like it.110 Another, typified by the work of Alexandra
Natapoff, is to canvass a large number of examples and to identify trends and
patterns that become recognizable.111 “No one story—no one jurisdiction—
is fully representative of the system as a whole,” Natapoff admits, but
examples can nevertheless serve as “warning signs” of a larger system that
enables them to occur with frequency.112
Id. It seems unlikely that special purpose districts would be empowered to utilize criminal
sanctions, and my research has not uncovered any such power.
107. Id.
108. For example, to achieve the typical “confidence level” used in physical sciences (95
percent) with a population size of 38,917, the necessary sample size to study would be 7703.
This would be to achieve a +/- 1 percent margin of error.
109. Natapoff makes a similar observation about the misdemeanor system that she studied:
“Another reason that this book hasn’t been written before is that it is very hard to get national
information about the petty-offense process.” NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 13.
110. See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979) (studying New Haven, Connecticut); KOHLERHAUSMANN, supra note 28 (studying New York City).
111. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 16–17.
112. Id. at 17; see also Stephanos Bibas, Small Crimes, Big Injustices, 117 MICH. L. REV.
1025, 1028 (2019) (“The paucity of hard data often forces Natapoff to rely on colorful
anecdotes. These can be striking and illuminating, and she tells her stories well. But the
stories can simultaneously be frustrating, because a cluster of well-picked anecdotes do not
add up to data. Often, Natapoff has no choice and has to tell her story this way. But skeptical
readers will at times wonder how representative those anecdotes are and how different
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In what follows, I will aim to do the same as Natapoff—not to undertake
a comprehensive study of all local criminal offenses or even a scientifically
randomized sample—but to highlight a number of localities where a certain
drafting pattern was observed. Like Darryl Brown’s study mentioned above,
I aim only to “identify trends” observed during my encounter with the
codes.113 In the next section, these trends will be discussed.
These trends were first observed in an initial group of fourteen local codes
that I selected using a randomizer application.114 Starting with Rodriguez
and Baker’s three categories of home rule,115 I randomly selected one
Dillon’s Rule state, three imperio home rule states, and three legislative home
rule states.116 Within each state, I chose one city or town randomly and one
county randomly. For three counties, I was unable to find any information
regarding the county code selected and instead read the city code of the
county seat. This was the initial group:
Table 6: Initial Local Codes Group

Dillon’s Rule
Imperio
Home Rule
Imperio
Home Rule
Imperio
Home Rule
Legislative
Home Rule
Legislative
Home Rule
Legislative
Home Rule

State

City/Town/Village

NC

Forest City

County (city if county
unavailable)
Harnett

VA

Newport News

King William

FL

Perry

St. John’s

CT

Meriden

Middletown (City)

MN

Wyoming

Waseca

MO

Bowling Green

Greenfield (City)

NJ

Vineland

Camden (City)

After this, and to see if very large cities wrote criminal law differently, I
reviewed the codes of two of the largest U.S. localities, New York City and
Los Angeles. I also looked at a small number of municipal governments

anecdotes might cast misdemeanor enforcement in a better light. Regardless, her plea for
better information and closer scrutiny is clearly right.”).
113. Brown, supra note 12, at 294.
114. RANDOM.ORG, https://www.random.org/lists [https://perma.cc/A6TM-LPXT] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
115. See supra note 98.
116. I did this because I expected, ex ante, that there might be some differences in the form
and content of local codes depending on the state constitutional law that authorized the local
criminalization.
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specifically located in modern code states to find examples of the harmful
asymmetry mentioned in the introduction.117
C. Local Criminal Law—Observed Trends
1. Code Organization
A good place to begin is the manner in which the codes are organized (if
the locality has what can even be called a “code”).118 Some trends were
observed as prevalent.
First, like in state law, many localities create separate chapters in their
codes and title them “offenses” or something similar.119 These are the crimes
that localities are creating most consciously. Within these “offense”
chapters, some patterns were noticeable. Localities sometimes incorporate
all state law misdemeanors by reference into their local law120 or copy these
misdemeanors word for word into their codes.121 Other localities do not
engage in this wholesale copying of state law but instead, pick and choose
117. Specifically, I analyzed the code of Dodge City, Kansas. In my review of state
criminal codes, I was struck by the excellent drafting methods employed by Kansas. Thus, to
find an egregious example of asymmetry, I chose a random locality in that state and looked
for archaic criminal offenses. Dodge City is described below. See infra notes 173–89.
118. Robinson and Cahill observe that disorganization in the collection of a jurisdiction’s
criminal law is also a problem at the state level. Robinson et al., supra note 55, at 2, 5 (“Indeed,
many American criminal codes are not true codes at all, in the modern sense of cohesive, wellstructured, and self-contained statutory schemes. Rather, they are mere collections of statutory
provisions similar to the generalized legislative ‘codes’ of the last century and before. In many
instances, even states that adopted modern, systematic criminal codes—typically during the
recodification wave of the 1960s and 1970s—have since altered their codes through ad hoc
amendment, making them dramatically less systematic and internally consistent.”).
119. See, e.g., PERRY, FLA., CODE ch. 18 (2019); WYOMING, MINN., CODE ch. 22 (2020);
BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE ch. 215 (2020); GREENFIELD, MO., CODE ch. 210 (2020); FOREST
CITY, N.C., CODE ch. 13 (2019); KING WILLIAM COUNTY, VA., CODE ch. 42 (2018); NEWPORT
NEWS, VA., CODE ch. 28 (2020).
120. E.g., PERRY, FLA., CODE § 18-1(b) (“Unlawful to commit state misdemeanors and
criminal traffic offenses; adoption of state law. It shall be unlawful for any person to commit,
within the corporate limits of the city, any act which is or shall be recognized by the laws of
the state as a misdemeanor or a criminal traffic offense, and the commission of such acts is
hereby forbidden. Such laws are hereby adopted by reference and incorporated as fully as if
set out at length herein.”).
121. See generally BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE. Bowling Green has an extensive code
that includes provisions on modes of liability, such as conspiracy and attempt, and also a vast
number of substantive offenses. Compare, for example, the local ordinance definition of
attempt, id. § 215.020 (“Guilt for an offense may be based upon an attempt to commit an
offense if, with the purpose of committing the offense, a person performs any act which is a
substantial step towards the commission of the offense.”), with the state law definition, MO.
REV. STAT. § 562.012 (2017) (“Guilt for an offense may be based upon an attempt to commit
an offense if, with the purpose of committing the offense, a person performs any act which is
a substantial step towards the commission of the offense.”). Compare also the local ordinance
definition of assault, BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE § 215.120 (“The person attempts to cause
or recklessly causes physical injury, physical pain or illness to another person.”), with the state
law’s assault in the fourth degree, MO. REV. STAT. § 565.056 (“The person attempts to cause
or recklessly causes physical injury, physical pain, or illness to another person.”). A similar
pattern was observed in the other Missouri locality studied, the city of Greenfield. See
generally GREENFIELD, MO., CODE ch. 210.
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what they incorporate.122 Beyond these “copycat” offenses, though, one
finds a variegated world of what can be called purely local “inventions”
stuffed into the “offenses” chapters. These offenses may have state law
analogues that cover similar conduct, but the text and elements of the
offenses are not borrowed from state law. I will discuss these in depth
below,123 but for now consider two local inventions included in the
“offenses” section by Newport News, Virginia. The city punishes
“engag[ing] in the activity commonly known as ‘trick or treat’” when the
participant is over the age of twelve or past seventh grade.124 Accompanying
parents are excepted, but they are forbidden from wearing masks.125 The city
also created an offense for “[d]irecting [the] beam of [a] laser pen, flashlight
or similar device into the eyes of another person.”126
Local criminal law also exists outside “offenses” chapters, though. Some
localities promulgate freestanding, locally invented offenses that are placed
ad hoc throughout the local code and are not delimited within the more
recognizable chapter of “offenses.” These local offenses are recognizable as
criminal in nature because of their sanctions, not their labelling. Like the
local inventions just discussed, they are often random in content and difficult
to characterize. For example, in the city of Camden, New Jersey, it is a
criminal offense to “allow or permit ragweed or poison ivy to grow” on one’s
land127 and also to work as a masseur for a client of the opposite sex.128 This

122. See, e.g., NEWPORT NEWS, VA., CODE. The city appears to have adopted many of the
state-law misdemeanors but not in the same comprehensive fashion as the localities discussed
immediately above. Compare the local “profanity” offense, id. § 28-13 (“If any person shall
use obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious or indecent language, or make any suggestion
or proposal of an obscene nature, or threaten any illegal or immoral act with the intent to
coerce, intimidate or harass any person, over any telephone in this city, such person shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.”), with the state law profanity offense, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-427
(2020) (“Any person who uses obscene, vulgar, profane, lewd, lascivious, or indecent
language, or makes any suggestion or proposal of an obscene nature, or threatens any illegal
or immoral act with the intent to coerce, intimidate, or harass any person, over any telephone
or citizens band radio, in this Commonwealth, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”).
123. See infra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
124. NEWPORT NEWS, VA., CODE § 28-5(a) (“If any person beyond the seventh grade of
school or over twelve (12) years of age shall engage in the activity commonly known as ‘trick
or treat’ or any other activity of similar character or nature under any name whatsoever, such
person shall be guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor. Nothing herein shall be construed as
prohibiting any parent, guardian or other responsible person having lawfully in his custody a
child twelve (12) years old or younger, from accompanying such child who is playing ‘trick
or treat’ for the purpose of caring for, looking after or protecting such child. However, no
accompanying parent or guardian shall wear a mask of any type.”).
125. Id.
126. Id. § 28-41 (“It shall be unlawful and a Class 4 misdemeanor for any person to
intentionally, and without good cause, direct the beam from a laser pen, flashlight or similar
device into the eyes (or eye) of another person.”).
127. “No owner, tenant or occupant of any plot of land, lot, street, highway, right-of-way
or any other public or private place shall cause, allow or permit ragweed or poison ivy to grow
or exist thereon.” CAMDEN, N.J., CODE § 232-2 (2019).
128. “No person engaged or employed in the business of a masseur or masseuse shall treat
a person of the opposite sex.” Id. § 496-2.
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ad hoc method is how both New York City and Los Angeles “organize” (if it
can be called that) their local crimes.129
The final organizational trend to note is the use of a “general penalty”
provision that applies to violations of an ordinance when a penalty is not
mentioned in a specific provision.130 This often provides for a punishment
of up to a few months imprisonment as well as probation.131 General
penalties may be the source of the largest category of local crimes. Consider
the general penalty’s application in the city of Perry, Florida (population
7017).132 An ordinance prohibits “mark[ing], defac[ing], [or] disfigur[ing]”
property in a public park in the chapter entitled “Parks and Recreation Areas”
but provides for no sanction.133 Despite placing this rule outside of the
separate “Offenses and Miscellaneous Provisions” chapter, the rule is
nevertheless criminally enforced because of the general penalty provision
announced at the beginning of the code: “[W]here no specific penalty is
provided therefor[e], the violation of any provision of this Code shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) or
imprisonment for a term not exceeding sixty (60) days or by both such fine
and imprisonment.”134
These code organization trends are worth noting, but they are not the
central object of this study. The next section will do a deeper analysis of the
text of the individual offenses—whether they be found in an “offenses”
chapter or are placed ad hoc in the local code or whether they become
criminal in nature by way of a general penalty.
2. The Form of Specific Offenses
The most interesting thing that one notices when one analyzes a large
number of local criminal offenses is that they are usually drafted in the
129. See generally L.A., CAL., CODE (1987); N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE (2020).
130. See, e.g., WYOMING, MINN., CODE § 1-13 (2020) (general penalty of up to ninety days
imprisonment); CAMDEN, N.J., CODE § 1-15 (same).
131. MERIDEN, CONN., CODE § 1-4 (2019); PERRY, FLA., CODE § 1-9 (2019); WYOMING,
MINN., CODE § 1-13; BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE § 100.220 (2020); GREENFIELD, MO., CODE
§ 100.220 (2020); FOREST CITY, N.C., CODE § 1-13 (2019); CAMDEN, N.J., CODE § 1-15
VINELAND, N.J., CODE § 1-15 (2020).
132. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in Florida:
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-and-towns.html [https://perma.cc/Z5RJ-V7TF] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
133. See PERRY, FLA., CODE § 19-52.
134. Id. § 1-9. As another example, in just the last year, the city of Wyoming, Minnesota,
created a criminal offense by including a statutory chapter entitled “SEXUAL OFFENDERS AND
SEXUAL PREDATORS,” WYOMING, MINN., CODE ch. 16, div. 6, which prohibits, among other
things, registered sex offenders from “participat[ing] in a holiday event involving children
under eighteen (18) years of age, such as distributing candy or other items to children on
Halloween, wearing a Santa Claus costume on or preceding Christmas, or wearing an Easter
Bunny costume on or preceding Easter.” Id. § 16-112. The chapter includes no instruction on
the specified penalty, so the general penalty (up to ninety days imprisonment) applies by
default: “fine of up to $1,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 90 days or by both such
fine and imprisonment.” Id. § 1-13.
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archaic manner. The use of precise and detailed offense elements with
corresponding mental elements is frequently eschewed, and very often a
mental element is entirely absent. In other words, clarity and culpability are
often lacking—especially culpability. A common form of a local offense is:
“no person shall θ” (θ meaning some given conduct). A helpful label for this
offense form is a “strict liability command.”
The most significant observation that must be conveyed is the widespread
absence of mental elements in local criminal offenses—in other words, a
general disregard for the requirement of culpability. As Brown describes,
“the effect of mens rea requirements for each offense element provides its
normative appeal: the degree of liability and punishment will be
proportionate to culpability and limited by it.”135 A culpability requirement
“ensures that one is punished only for choices one has made, not for events
one did not will or anticipate.”136 Nevertheless, local criminal law seems to
very frequently dispense with mens rea. Consider these offenses from the
standpoint of the culpability they require (or not), first from two large urban
jurisdictions, and then from some lesser-known localities. All impose “strict
liability”:

135. Brown, supra note 12, at 291.
136. Id. at 292.
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Table 7: Large Urban Jurisdictions

New York City
“Subway
gratings;
sweeping into”
“Unauthorized
operation of a
recording
device in a
place of public
performance
prohibited”
“Destruction
or removal of
property in
buildings or
structures”

“Bathing in
public”

137.
138.
139.
140.

“It shall be unlawful for any person to sweep any
substance from a sidewalk or other place into a grating
used for purposes of ventilating any subway
railroad.”137

“No person may engage in or cause or permit another to
engage in the unauthorized operation of a recording
device in a place of public performance.”138

“No person other than the owner of a building or
structure, the duly authorized agent of such owner, or an
appropriate legal authority shall destroy or remove any
part of such building or structure.”139
“It shall be unlawful for any person to swim or bathe in
any of the waters within the jurisdiction of the city,
except in public or private bathing houses, unless
covered with a bathing suit so as to prevent any
indecent exposure of the person; and it shall be
unlawful for any person to dress or undress in any place
exposed to view.”140

N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 19-173 (2019).
Id. § 10-702.
Id. § 10-118.
Id. § 10-123.
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“Silly String—
Hollywood
Division
During
Halloween”

“Injury to
Public
Property”

“Urinating or
Defecating in
Public”

“Animals at
Large”

141.
142.
143.
144.
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Los Angeles
“No person . . . shall possess, use, sell or distribute Silly
String at, within or upon any public or private property
that is either within public view or accessible to the
public, including, but not limited to, public or private
streets, sidewalks, parking lots, commercial or
residential buildings, places of business, or parks within
the Hollywood Division during Halloween.”141
“No person shall cut, break, destroy, remove, deface,
tamper with, mar, injure, disfigure, interfere with,
damage, tear, remove, change or alter any: (a) part of
any building belonging to this City; (b) drinking
fountain situated on any public street or sidewalk or any
appliance used in or about such foundation . . . .”142
“No person shall urinate or defecate in or upon any
public street, sidewalk, alley, plaza, beach, park, public
building or other publicly maintained facility or place,
or in any place open to the public or exposed to the
public view, except when using a urinal, toilet or
commode located in a restroom, or when using a
portable or temporary toilet or other facility designed
for the sanitary disposal of human waste and which is
enclosed from public view.”143
“A person who owns or is in charge of or controls or
who possesses a dog or other animal who permits,
allows or causes the dog or other animal to run, stray,
be uncontrolled or in any manner be in, upon, or at large
upon a public street, sidewalk, park or other public
property or in or upon the premises of private property
of another person is guilty of a misdemeanor if said dog
or other animal bites or causes injury to any human
being or other animal.”144

LOS ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 56.02 (1987).
Id. § 41.14.
Id. § 41.47.2.
Id. § 53.34.
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Table 8: Lesser Known Localities
Harnett
County,
North
Carolina

“Firearm
Restrictions”

Waseca
County,
Minnesota

“Identification
of Each Unit”

Wyoming,
Minnesota

“Curfew . . .
Established”

Vineland,
New Jersey

“Consumption
in Public
Prohibited”

Camden,
New Jersey

“Owner and
occupants not
to permit
growth”

Newport
News,
Virginia

“Urination or
defecation in
public”

“It shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge a firearm: (A) On a parcel of
property that contains 10,000 square feet
or less in overall dimension . . . .”145
“The entrance door to every efficiency or
rooming
unit
in
any
lodging
establishment shall be plainly marked on
the outside, either numerically or
alphabetically. No two units may be
assigned the same number or letter.”146
“It shall be unlawful for any minor of the
age 15 years or 16 years to loiter, idle or
be in or upon the public streets,
highways, parks, playgrounds or other
public grounds, public places, places of
entertainment, or refreshment or any
other unsupervised place within this city
between the hours of 11:00 p.m. on any
day and 5:00 a.m. the following day.”147
“It shall be unlawful for any person to
consume or offer to another for
consumption any alcoholic beverage in
or upon any public street, road, alley,
sidewalk, railroad right-of-way, parking
lot which is generally open to the public,
park, shopping plaza or upon any outdoor
facility owned or operated by the City of
Vineland.”148
“No owner, tenant or occupant of any
plot of land, lot, street, highway, right-ofway or any other public or private place
shall cause, allow or permit ragweed or
poison ivy to grow or exist thereon.”149
“It shall be unlawful for any person to
urinate or defecate in public or in a place
open to public view except in public
restroom facilities.”150

145. HARNETT COUNTY, N.C., CODE § 130.09 (2019).
146. Waseca County, Minn., Lodging Ordinance 100 § 12.19 (May 18, 2010), repealed by
Waseca County, Minn., Lodging Ordinance 132 § 9 (June 18, 2019).
147. WYOMING, MINN., CODE § 22-36 (2020).
148. VINELAND, N.J., CODE § 216-32 (2020).
149. CAMDEN, N.J., CODE § 159-2 (2019).
150. NEWPORT NEWS, VA., CODE § 28-43 (2020).
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King
William
County,
Virginia
Perry,
Florida

“Carnivals”
“Poles,
attaching
posters, etc.”

St. John’s
County,
Florida

“Prohibited
Presence,
Loitering or
Prowling at
Certain
Locations”

Meriden,
Connecticut

“Use of bells
and sirens”

[Vol. 89

“Any person engaged in the operation of
a carnival or circus show shall pay a
license
tax
of
$1,000.00
per
performance.”151
“It shall be unlawful to attach posters or
handbills to any telegraph, telephone,
light, signal or other pole or gas post
standing in the street or right-of-way.”152
“It is prohibited for a Sex Offender to be
on or within a Safety zone of a St. Johns
County park and recreation center,
school, daycare center, arcade, school
bus stop [sic] when children are
present . . . .”153
“No bell or siren on such ambulance shall
be rung, sounded or blown except in case
of extreme emergency when responding
to a call or transporting a patient to a
hospital, clinic or doctor’s office.”154

This is the most striking observation one encounters when one reads local
criminal offenses: the general disregard for the culpability requirement, and
the proliferation of strict liability. As mentioned before, this is a hallmark of
the archaic offense-drafting form.155
Another way of demonstrating this archaic trend is to look at the codes in
two Missouri localities mentioned earlier that adopted many state
misdemeanors but also created their own: Bowling Green and Greenfield.156
The contrast between the local and state offenses is illuminating. Here, the
state law “copycat” offenses were written with mens rea elements in the
modern form, but many local inventions—even the newer ones—were
written without these elements. Both codes read much more like a
comprehensive and modern criminal code, and both referenced a state law
passed in 1997 that empowered localities to “provide for the compilation or
revision and codification of the general ordinances of the municipality.”157
It appears that a local code reform movement followed the passage of this
law. Bowling Green, Missouri (population 5334158) compiled its ordinances
151. KING WILLIAM COUNTY, VA., CODE § 18-112 (2018).
152. PERRY, FLA., CODE § 18-4 (2019).
153. St. John’s County, Fla., Ordinance 2009-36 § 4 (Sept. 1, 2009).
154. MERIDEN, CONN., CODE § 62-9 (2019).
155. See supra Part I.
156. See supra note 121.
157. MO. REV. STAT. § 71.943 (2005).
158. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in Missouri:
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [hereinafter Annual Population Estimates,
Missouri], https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-total-citiesand-towns.html [https://perma.cc/S8MP-RLY4] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
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into a code in 2010,159 while Greenfield, Missouri (population 1371160), did
the same in 2007.161 Both have criminal offenses that were remarkably more
sophisticated in their composition than were most of the other localities’
offenses. Consider the language of the “false imprisonment” offense created
by Greenfield, which is identical (except in label) to the “kidnapping” offense
created by Bowling Green:
A person commits the offense of false imprisonment if he/she knowingly
restrains another unlawfully and without consent so as to interfere
substantially with his/her liberty.162

This is written in the modern form. It also appears that this language was
directly copied from the state’s “Kidnapping, third degree” offense.163
But Bowling Green and Greenfield did not always copy from the state. In
Greenfield, local officials criminalized owning more than three dogs or cats
(kittens and puppies excepted) but wrote the offense in this way:
No person shall at any time keep, harbor or own at one (1) location within
the City more than a total of three (3) dogs and/or cats over the age of six
(6) months.164

This statute is written with clarity but omits a mental element (culpability).
Now consider one of Bowling Green’s local inventions—the offense of
abandoning a vehicle:
No person shall abandon any motor vehicle on the right-of-way of any
public road or State highway or on any private real property owned by
another without his consent.165

Again, clear offense elements are discernable but not a mental element.
These Missouri localities demonstrate a pattern observed in many codes:
in general, when a locality innovates and creates a criminal offense where
there is no state law model, a mental element is left out. While exceptions
can be found, these are rare. Strict liability—a telltale aspect of archaic
offense drafting—seems to be the default when localities invent their own
offenses and deviate from state law models.
IV. HARMFUL STATE-LOCAL ASYMMETRY
As we have seen, a comparison of offense-drafting practices in state-level
jurisdictions and those of many localities broke down into two discernable
types: jurisdictions that generally drafted their offenses in the modern form

159. Bowling Green, Mo., Ordinance 1646 (Jan. 4, 2010).
160. Annual Population Estimates, Missouri, supra note 158.
161. Greenfield, Mo., Ordinance 3-2007 (Sept. 4, 2007).
162. GREENFIELD, MO., CODE § 210.040 (2020); see also BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE
§ 215.170 (2020).
163. MO. REV. STAT. § 565.130 (2017) (“Kidnapping, third degree, penalty. . . . A person
commits the offense of kidnapping in the third degree if he or she knowingly restrains another
unlawfully and without consent so as to interfere substantially with his or her liberty.”).
164. GREENFIELD, MO., CODE § 205.110.
165. BOWLING GREEN, MO., CODE § 225.020.
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and jurisdictions that generally drafted offenses in the archaic form.166 Key
to the modern-archaic distinction was the presence of clear culpability
requirements in modern offenses; these requirements enable the interpretive
practice of element analysis, thereby constraining an adjudicator’s
determination of liability and preventing the attribution of liability for wholly
innocent conduct. A slim majority of state-level jurisdictions (twenty-seven)
have modern drafting practices, yet the majority of the localities surveyed
engaged in archaic offense drafting.167 Strict liability offenses proliferate at
the local level, with local criminal law often appearing as a command to the
citizens not to engage in certain conduct.
Since archaic offense drafting exists at the state level, the discovery of its
replica at the local level is uninteresting as a discovery of some new
phenomenon. The significance of archaic local offenses, rather, is that they
can exist in the larger context of a state that has a modern criminal code. The
significance is not the drafting practice, but the mismatch of the practice with
the superior jurisdiction’s practice. This mismatch can be called “harmful
asymmetry,” the implications of which will be discussed below in Part IV.A.
A. Description and Implications
The most important phenomenon I highlight is this: a mismatch between
local offenses drafted in the archaic form and state offenses drafted in the
modern form.168 This harmful asymmetry results when the home rule powers
of the locality have been used to undermine the drafting advances made in
the criminal law in the larger jurisdiction. In cases of harmful asymmetry,
localities effectively become additional engines of code “degradation”
already taking place at the state level. To use Robinson and Cahill’s
metaphor, localities drastically increase the number of “barnacles” on the
“hull” of the ship.169
Consider the example of Kansas. Kansas has engaged in extensive
modernization of its criminal code, updating it comprehensively in 1970 and
again in 2011 after reports and recommendations by an expert
commission.170 Reviewing Kansas’s code in 2020, one is struck by the
166. See supra Part III.
167. See supra Part III.C.2.
168. While one can imagine the inverse—a “beneficial asymmetry,” in which the locality
drafts modern offenses while the state retains archaic offenses—I have found no examples of
this phenomenon and therefore table a consideration of its implications for a later day.
169. Robinson & Cahill, Model Penal Code Second, supra note 74, at 172.
170. 2 JOHN W. WHITE & BRETT WATSON, KAN. CRIM. CODE RECODIFICATION COMM’N,
2010 FINAL REPORT TO THE KANSAS LEGISLATURE 4 (2009), https://
www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/sites/default/files/2010%20Criminal%20Recodification%20
Final%20Report%20Vol%202_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L3N-3MXP] (“The Kansas Criminal
Code Recodification Commission has completed its assigned task to recodify the Kansas
criminal code and in this final report to the 2010 legislature submits its proposed criminal
code. . . . In K.S.A. 21-4801 the 2007 legislature created the Kansas Criminal Code
Recodification Commission and provided the Commission with the mission and directive to
recodify the Kansas criminal code. The Commission is composed of sixteen members
appointed by the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The Commission members
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scrupulous adherence to MPC principles of clear drafting and element
analysis. Kansas also has imperio home rule, though, rendering localities
constitutionally immune from state interference so long as their legislation
relates to local affairs.171
If we zoom in to look at the code of one of Kansas’s cities, we see a
different picture. Consider Dodge City (population 27,340172). Dodge City’s
Code of Ordinances appears extensive, with sixteen chapters that range in
content from zoning regulations to building codes.173 Some chapters that
appear to be civil-regulatory chapters are, on closer inspection, criminal
chapters, including ordinances such as the Historic Resources Preservation
Ordinance,174 the article governing beekeeping,175 the ordinance governing
pit bull ownership,176 business regulations,177 the noise ordinance,178 and
others.179 Moreover, the code also has a “General Penalty” provision
authorizing a fine of up to $499 or 179 days imprisonment for offenses that
do not carry a specific penalty.180 But if we turn to Chapter XI—Public
Offenses—we find what the city appears to intentionally view as criminal
offenses.181 First, one notices that Dodge City incorporates by reference the
“Uniform Public Offense Code” promulgated by the League of Kansas
Municipalities.182 The Uniform Code is 165 pages long and is constantly
updated by the league.183 It is drafted in the modern form and makes explicit
references to analogous state statutes.184 Dodge City does not end its own
public offense code with the article adopting the Uniform Code, though. It
continues for six more articles, creating a large number of new criminal
offenses.185 Immediately after reading the modern Uniform Code, one is
surprised to see a very different form of offense drafting in the next section:
represent a broad spectrum of experience and interest in the criminal law. . . . The present
criminal law of Kansas consists basically of statutes enacted by the 1969 Legislature made
effective July 1, 1970.”).
171. Rodriguez & Baker, supra note 98, at 1393.
172. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in Kansas:
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-and-towns.html [https://perma.cc/UZ74-6QGQ] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
173. See generally DODGE CITY, KAN., CODE (2019).
174. Id. § 1-703.
175. Id. § 2-304.
176. Id. § 2-409.
177. Id. § 5-220.
178. Id. § 8-405.
179. E.g., id. § 15-407(h)(3) (water emergency rules).
180. Id. § 1-116.
181. Id. § 11-101. I say this because of the attempt to include them in one chapter and the
use of the word “offense.”
182. Id.
183. UNIF. PUB. OFFENSE CODE FOR KAN. CITIES (LEAGUE OF KAN. MUNS. 2019),
https://www.dodgecity.org/DocumentCenter/View/1128/UPOC?bidId=
[https://perma.cc/
L747-XSMC].
184. Id. § 3.1 (“(a) Battery is: (1) Knowingly or recklessly causing bodily harm to another
person; or (2) Knowingly causing physical contact with another person when done in a rude,
insulting or angry manner. (b) Battery is a Class B violation. (K.S.A. 21-5413).”).
185. DODGE CITY, KAN., CODE ch. XI, arts. 2–7.
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OBSTRUCTING GUTTERS. It shall be unlawful for any person to place
any obstruction in any gutter or culvert, or do any act to prevent the flow
of water through any gutter, drain or culvert in the city.186

When innovating in the “Local Regulations” article, the city drops mens rea
almost entirely.187 Another offense in this article reads, “URINATION;
DEFECATION. (a) Urination and defecation at, in, within or upon any
public place in the city is hereby prohibited.”188 Other offenses after the
Local Regulations are drafted with mental elements—including narcotics,
public nudity, and juvenile curfew offenses—but one offense is not (walking
on the road).189
The case of Dodge City, Kansas, is illustrative. Not only does the locality
resist the wholesale adoption of the modern drafting practices of the state
code, it also fails to learn from the lessons imparted by the model code
promulgated by the League of Kansas Municipalities.190 While its provisions
are adopted, they are done so uncritically; when the locality innovates on its
own, the resultant offenses look completely different from those in the model.
Harmful asymmetry exists in Dodge City and in an unknown, but potentially
vast, number of other localities.191
Here, and in these other jurisdictions, home rule powers have had the effect
of turning back the clock on the advances in criminal offense drafting. In
these localities, the substantive criminal law does little, if anything, to
prevent certain negative pathologies that the state criminal code was
rewritten to fix. With no clear culpability requirements, the proliferation of
local strict liability commands broadens criminal liability to the point that all
violations of the ordinances cannot possibly be meant to be punished. For
example, the Dodge City urination offense192 would cover an incontinent
elderly person being wheeled through a park. But since no prosecutor or
police officer would ever enforce the ordinances in these cases, the
overbreadth built into the offense by the local legislature works (whether
deliberately or not) as a delegation of lawmaking authority to law
enforcement. William Stuntz describes this well:
Because criminal law is broad, prosecutors cannot possibly enforce the law
as written: there are too many violators. Broad criminal law thus means
that the law as enforced will differ from the law on the books. And the
former will be defined by law enforcers, by prosecutors’ decisions to
prosecute and police decisions to arrest.193

186. Id. § 11-201.
187. It only appears in an offense regarding the sale of spray paint to minors. Id. § 11210(b).
188. Id. § 11-206.
189. Id. ch. XI, arts. 4–6; id. § 11-701.
190. Id. § 11-101.
191. The previous discussion of the drafting quality in the codes of Bowling Green and
Greenfield, Missouri provides another example of harmful asymmetry. See supra notes 156–
65.
192. See supra note 188.
193. Stuntz, supra note 24, at 519.

2020]

LOCAL OFFENSES

871

Without offense-drafting practices that maximize the potential of criminal
law to constrain officials at the adjudication stage—most especially the
absence of a culpability requirement—the result is executive lawmaking (at
its best) and potentially arbitrary and discriminatory use of that discretion (at
its worst).194 Discretion that is constrained at the state level is set free at the
local level—perhaps the place where it should be most constrained, given
that objectivity of the enforcement authority may be diminished in a smaller
jurisdiction. As we will see in Part V, the proliferation of misdemeanors that
are easily proved (especially strict liability misdemeanors) also has other
very concrete and deleterious effects on citizens’ lives, even when the
maximum punishment is very light.
B. Two Causal Hypotheses
While this Article is concerned mostly with the effects of harmful
asymmetry and does not purport to offer an explanation of its causes, two
causal hypotheses are worth considering (I will not attempt to prove or
disprove either here). Such consideration may help to elucidate further the
harmfulness described above. These causal hypotheses are (1) the reduced
institutional competence of local governments, or (2) the deliberate
broadening of liability and a resultant delegation of enforcement decisions to
prosecutors and police. Of course, these are alternative hypotheses and
cannot be simultaneously true. Ignorance and intentionality are in conceptual
tension. Either, though, might explain archaic offense drafting in states with
modern criminal codes.
1. Hypothesis One: Reduced Institutional Competence
First, consider the possibility that local lawmaking boards and councils
simply do not understand how to write criminal offenses with precise
culpability requirements that facilitate element analysis by an adjudicator.
Perhaps they do not understand that in the inclusion of their general penalty
provisions, or the inclusion of a criminal sanction at the end of a substantive
chapter of codes, they are really creating criminal laws just like the criminal
laws in a state penal code. And even if they did understand, they did not
realize that these kinds of laws are normally written very differently from the
way you would write rules for, say, the local pool or the local park. While
“you shall not X” seems to make intuitive sense to a nonlawyer aiming to
prohibit certain activity, it is a bad way to write a criminal offense. Recalling
Brown’s description of the first “ambition” of the MPC, we can see how
reduced competence with respect to offense drafting undermines this goal:
to “bring analytical clarity to the definition and interpretation of criminal
statutes” that had suffered from a “tradition of poor drafting.”195
194. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1759–60 (2006)
(“Scholars have long pointed out that law enforcement discretion is so broad, unregulated, and
opaque that it weakens many precepts of rule of law and democratic accountability.”).
195. Brown, supra note 12, at 287.
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There is some reason to support the claim that many of the local offenses
drafted in the archaic form are drafted in this way because of local ignorance.
First, consider the competence issues intrinsic to the vast majority of
lawmaking bodies in localities. The most significant problem is the most
obvious one: localities will usually be small in population and will therefore
have fewer legislators who are likely to be trained in even the most basic
understanding of criminal law. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau in 2017
indicates that of the approximately 39,000 localities,196 28,682 towns and
cities have populations less than 5000 people,197 and 687 counties have
populations less than 10,000 people.198 Most of local criminal law (about 75
percent), then, is made by comparatively small communities who may or may
not have a lawyer as a resident—let alone a lawyer as a legislator. As James
Madison observed in Federalist No. 10, “the proportion of fit characters be
not less in the large than in the small republic” and therefore in a larger polity
there is “a greater probability of a fit choice.”199
The smaller population of localities, moreover, also results in smaller
budgets and a reduced ability to fund a staff to advise the local board on
ordinances it seeks to create. We do not expect members of Congress or state
legislatures to understand the technical aspects of criminal offense drafting,
but we do expect them to have lawyers on staff who can advise them on it.
This is largely lacking in the vast majority of low-population, and therefore
low-budget, localities. A common model appears to be that the “town” or
“city” attorney is a private attorney with a separate practice, and the
municipality acts as but one of the different “clients” of the attorney.
Meriden, Connecticut, some of whose offenses are mentioned above, lists
three attorneys as its “legal department,”200 but all three of them appear to
have outside practices that are their full-time jobs—one is a criminal defense
lawyer201 and the other two are civil litigators.202 It is unclear whether any
of these attorneys have any role in advising the city council on legislative
drafting in the manner of a professional legislative staff. Meriden, though,

196. Government Units by State: Census Years 1942 to 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html
[https://perma.cc/Q8DB-4LHH] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
197. Subcounty General-Purpose Governments by Population-Size Group and State, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html
[https://perma.cc/5FXH-NAK3] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
198. County Governments by Population-Size Group and State, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html
[https://perma.cc/JP3D-FHD4].
199. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
200. City of Meriden, Legal Department, MERIDENCT.GOV, https://www.meridenct.gov/
staff/law [https://perma.cc/8FCQ-QL4W] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
201. Michael D. Quinn, MAHON, QUINN & MAHON, P.C., https://www.mqmlawyer.com/
attorneys/michael-d-quinn [https://perma.cc/V3YS-X8XC] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
202. Christopher Clark, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/christopher-clarkbb557969 [https://perma.cc/F4BL-SQY4] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020); Stephanie Dellolio, URY
& MOSKOW LLC, https://www.urymoskow.com/about/stephanie-dellolio [https://perma.cc/
J8GT-HSMB] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
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has a population of around 60,000.203 Consider a smaller locality whose
offenses were discussed earlier: Greenfield, Missouri (population 1371204).
Greenfield’s website lists one “city attorney,” who appears to have a solo
private practice in the city.205 Again, this attorney’s involvement in advising
the city council on legislative drafting is unknown (although local law
dictates that the attorney not advise on legislation unless asked!).206
Another feature that may be at work in creating this competency deficit is
a feature extrinsic to the local governments: the lack of outside professional
groups’ attention to local criminal laws. Indifference or lack of resources on
the part of the groups that are competent to assist in drafting offenses or to
scrutinize existing ones, therefore, compounds the intrinsic competence
shortfall of the local boards. By “outside groups” I mean the various
organizations and institutes in which lawyers associate for the betterment of
the legal system. These include, most universally, the bar associations of the
various jurisdictions. While state bars are large enough to form commissions
and committees to study existing and proposed criminal laws, the same is not
true for most localities. Of the approximately 75 percent of local
governments covering populations of less than 5000, there may be only a
single attorney in each—or none. Returning to Greenfield, Missouri, an
internet search reveals only four active attorneys.207 These jurisdictions will
not have bar associations.
Beyond the practicing bar, legal academia has, of course, an important role
in monitoring and commenting on the development of criminal codes. Most
localities, though, are unlikely to have a local law school; if they do, the
criminal law professor may be the only specialist in the state and is more
likely to focus on state law. Academia seems to be poorly suited to the task
of advising local boards on criminal legislation.
Nationally, the ALI took the lead in creating an MPC and pointing out the
problems in many states’ criminal laws. The ALI is composed of respected
lawyers, judges, and law professors, all with deep expertise in their respective
fields.208 But given its scope, the ALI cannot turn its attention to localities.
203. See Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in
Connecticut: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-and-towns.html [https://perma.cc/
47UT-LM5J] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
204. Annual Population Estimates, Missouri, supra note 158.
205. City Council, GREENFIELD, MO., https://greenfieldmo.org/city-council.php?The-Page1 [https://perma.cc/J9LR-4VJF] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
206. GREENFIELD, MO., CODE § 115.280 (2020) (“The City Attorney shall, in addition to
his/her other duties which are or may be required by this Code or other ordinance, when
ordered by the Mayor or Board of Aldermen to do so, prosecute or defend all suits and actions
originating or pending in any court of this State to which the City is a party or in which the
City is interested . . . . The City Attorney shall give his/her opinion to City Officials only after
being so requested by the Board of Aldermen.”).
207. The Official Missouri Directory of Lawyers, THE MO. BAR, https://mobar.org/
site/content/For-the-Public/Lawyer_Directory.aspx [https://perma.cc/2PN7-AARC] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020) (type “Greenfield” in “City Contains” field and select “Find”).
208. See Membership, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/members/ [https://perma.cc/
GR4B-RAUV] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (“Our membership consists of eminent judges,
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All of the traditional outside groups that assist in the creation and
monitoring209 of criminal offenses are of no avail to the vast majority of
localities.
2. Hypothesis Two: Deliberate Overdeterrence
While competency issues due to low population and reduced legal
expertise likely account for many local offenses written in the archaic form,
this cannot explain similar offenses in large city codes or where there is
evidence of careful and deliberate offense drafting that nevertheless rejects
modern drafting paradigms. With these offenses, an alternative hypothesis
to consider is that the city council intends to overdeter, and hopes that law
enforcement authorities will wisely exercise their discretion to avoid
punishing outlier cases. As discussed above, this form of overbreadth in the
archaic offense-drafting form usually means that the offense omits any
mention of a mental element.210 If use of strict liability is intentional, then
what Brown calls the “second ambition” of the MPC is similarly undermined:
the “substantive” goal of “a criminal law committed to a pervasive
requirement of subjective culpability with respect to every significant
element of every offense.”211
Samuel Buell describes this possible explanation of intentional
overbreadth well: “[A]nnouncing that sanctions may apply not only to
undesirable behaviors but also to behaviors akin or proximate to undesirable
ones pushes actors back from the boundaries of the law . . . .”212 The idea is
that “lawmakers mean to overdeter.”213 Buell cites Dan Kahan, arguing that
“a ‘prudence of obfuscation’ . . . is designed to induce uncertainty and
restraint among persons who seek to pursue undesirable behaviors within the
literal terms of legal rules.”214 I would add to this that the obfuscation
intended against the bad actors may often be coupled with a presumption of
the enforcement authorities’ wise discretion to ameliorate unjust application
of the literal offense in outlier cases. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III channels
this argument, writing, “[b]ecause elected officials recognize that inflexible
lawyers, and law professors . . . selected on the basis of professional achievement and
demonstrated interest in improving the law.”).
209. A bit more should be said about the special role such groups can play in the period
after an offense is created—what I call the “monitoring role.” When a locality adopts state
offenses as its own, this obviates the drafting issues discussed above but creates other
problems of desuetude. For example, Newport News, Virginia, has copied—and retains—the
offense of “cohabitation” directly from the state code, but this offense was later repealed at
the state level in 2013. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (repealed Mar. 30, 2013); NEWPORT NEWS,
VA., CODE § 28-16 (2020). Without the resources and attention of outside expert groups to
monitor a code of offenses, even initial reliance by a locality on the model statutes of the state
can, through time, result in strange relics remaining on the books.
210. See supra Part II.B.
211. Brown, supra note 12, at 287–88.
212. Buell, supra note 26, at 1501.
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—but Only for the Virtuous,
96 MICH. L. REV. 127,129 (1997)).
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rules can lead to unjust results and an unwise allocation of prosecutorial time
and energy, these officials properly delegate substantial enforcement
discretion to prosecutors and other actors.”215
The case of a Dayton, Ohio, dog control ordinance illustrates a potential
example of this phenomenon. The offense provided that “[n]o person shall
own, keep, possess, harbor, maintain, or have the care, custody, or control of
a vicious dog within the city.”216 When a pit bull broke free from its owner
and subsequently attacked another dog, the owner was charged with a
violation of the ordinance.217 The owner challenged the offense as invalidly
imposing strict liability, but this was rejected by a state appellate court.218
The local legislature wrote in the “Defenses” section to the ordinance that
“[l]ack of intent or knowledge is not a defense to a violation of this section,”
and therefore the court held that legislative intent for strict liability was
manifest.219 Interestingly, the court then went out of its way to take judicial
notice of the MPC’s prohibition on strict liability for offenses, like the
Dayton dog ordinance, that carried a potential sentence of incarceration.220
Clear legislative intent, though, trumped the MPC’s aspirational
guidelines.221 Moreover, the court ended its discussion by stating that strict
liability and even incarceration was a rational response by the legislature to
this social problem: “While the potential penalty [of six months
imprisonment] embodied in the vicious dog statute is eminently harsh, when
viewed against the public safety, these sections are legitimate police power
The Dayton ordinance may show an intentional
enactments.”222
overdeterrence by the use of strict liability due to the dangerousness of
vicious dogs.
Consider also a similar law recently enacted in my hometown—Cobleskill,
New York (population 4678223). The town board created a criminal offense
prohibiting dogs “Running at Large” and wrote it in the archaic form as a
strict liability offense:
Running at Large
A. It shall be unlawful . . . for any person owning or having charge, care,
custody or control of any dog to permit such dog to be upon any private
215. Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1099, 1132 (2014).
216. City of Dayton v. Dye, No. 9539, 1986 WL 12353, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1986)
(quoting DAYTON, OHIO, CODE § 91.50(B) (2004)). For a later case reapplying Dye to another
provision of the ordinance, see Ohio v. Thaler, No. 22579, 2008 WL 4684367, at *4–5 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2008).
217. Dye, 1986 WL 12353, at *1.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at *2.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated Places in New York:
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-and-towns.html [https://perma.cc/7Q23-LWF4] (last
visited Nov. 3, 2020).
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property without the permission of the occupant of such private
property . . . .224

A local news article reporting on the debate over the ordinance is revealing.
First, the genesis of the offense appears to be a personal experience of the
town supervisor.225 A dog bit him while he was on a run, he reported this to
the state police, and the police asked if he had provoked the dog.226 This
response by the state police, seemingly blaming him for the bite, “bothered”
him (the New York Penal Code indicates no applicable state offenses relating
to dogs, and therefore it is likely that the state police had no probable cause
to address the issue as a criminal matter).227 One citizen at the meeting
expressed concern that the offense would seem to apply to cases in which his
dogs went onto his neighbor’s property with the neighbor’s permission.228
While this would plainly be excluded by the terms of the offense, the town
supervisor’s response was revealing. Instead of noting the textual exception
for the property occupant’s consent, the supervisor reassured the citizen with
an allusion to selective enforcement: “Let’s be frank. This is for people who
don’t take care of their dogs.”229 Here, an intentionally broad, strict liability
offense is created to redress a gap in state law (also, because of a legislator’s
personal experience), and concerns of overbreadth are assuaged by what
must be an expectation of wise enforcement discretion. The law on the books
does not matter; the textual exception for an owner’s consent does not matter.
The “frank” meaning of the law is the way in which it is expected to be
applied on the street and that is only against bad people—the people who
“don’t take care of their dogs.”
V. LOCAL OFFENSES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SCHOLARSHIP:
MISDEMEANORLAND AND DEMOCRATIZATION
While the primary aim of this Article is to unearth and analyze the
phenomenon of harmful asymmetry between state and local criminal law
drafting practices, a secondary aim is to assess the consequences of this for
some influential contemporary debates in criminal law scholarship. Two
bodies of literature are most implicated: (1) the newly burgeoning body of
work addressing the misdemeanor criminal justice system and (2) the
movement to “democratize” criminal justice. Scholarship regarding socalled “misdemeanorland” highlights the impact of low-level offenses on
citizens’ lives and critiques the system’s departure from the traditional
224. COBLESKILL, N.Y., CODE § 52-5 (2019).
225. Patsy Nicosia, Cobleskill Goes with Dog Law, TIMES-J. (July 10, 2019),
https://www.timesjournalonline.com/article.asp?id=104550
[https://perma.cc/GR4BRAUV].
226. Id.
227. Id. This is understandable given New York’s substantial adherence to the MPC (and
the MPC’s avoidance of public welfare offenses). See supra Part II.A.
228. Nicosia, supra note 225 (“Also speaking at Monday’s public hearing, Jerry Coons
asked if he’d be ticketed or fined if his dogs went on his neighbor’s property with their
permission.”).
229. Id.
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“adjudicative,” rule-bound criminal justice model concerned with factual
guilt for blameworthy conduct. The replacement is a “managerial” model,
concerned with social control through procedural hurdles, in which officials
often act lawlessly.230 The democratization movement in criminal justice,
on the other hand, addresses the problem of racially skewed mass
incarceration and blames the current system’s bureaucratic approach that
prioritizes expertise and efficiency over just outcomes that accord with
community moral views.231 The antidote to bureaucratization, these scholars
claim, is democratization—a reorientation toward lay values.
Harmful asymmetry caused by archaically drafted local criminal law is
relevant to both scholarly conversations. For misdemeanorland, harmful
asymmetry can be seen as compounding the problem of lawlessness by
creating poorly written law; it is bad enough when officials ignore the
existence of an offense element, but it is arguably worse when an element
that serves an important limiting function is absent textually. For
democratization, the phenomenon of harmful asymmetry pushes back against
the attack on expertise and the defense of lay values. At the level of a local
government—normally a more “democratic” level of government—criminal
law is drafted in a manner that ignores modern methods and has harmful
effects. Meanwhile, the states, influenced by experts such as the ALI and the
professoriate, draft offenses in a superior manner.
A. Misdemeanorland
First, consider the burgeoning literature of the last two years that has
addressed the misdemeanor criminal justice system, led largely by the
contributions of Alexandra Natapoff and Issa Kohler-Hausmann.232 How is
the phenomenon of harmful asymmetry relevant here? Scholars studying the
misdemeanor system are primarily concerned with the effects of the
misdemeanor investigation and adjudication process, and therefore, the level
of government that creates the misdemeanor offense is rarely mentioned.
However, since in most states, localities can only create misdemeanor-level
offenses, local criminal law is surely part of the story Natapoff and KohlerHausmann are telling.233
230. See infra Part V.A.
231. See infra Part V.B.
232. See Alexandra Natapoff, The High Stakes of Low-Level Criminal Justice, 128 YALE
L.J. 1648, 1651–52 (2019) (reviewing KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 28, and citing other
recent scholarship regarding misdemeanors).
233. One caveat is worth mentioning, though: many of the observations noted above have
limited relevance once one looks outside of large, urban misdemeanor court systems. KohlerHausmann, for example, studied the misdemeanor system in New York City, while Natapoff
frequently draws on her experience working in Baltimore. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra
note 28; Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1333–34, 1359. In a smaller jurisdiction with fewer police
officers and fewer misdemeanor cases, it may be that “misdemeanorland” more resembles the
adjudicative model of “felonyland.” However, in smaller systems, the problems of
lawlessness may also be exacerbated. Rural New York, for example, is notorious for
permitting nonlawyers to sit as local magistrates. See, e.g., William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts
of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/
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Some background is necessary. The issues raised by the misdemeanorland
literature can largely be summed up in the phrase first coined by Malcolm
Feeley: “the process is the punishment.”234 In other words, with
misdemeanor offenses, the real systemic aim of the endeavor is putting the
defendant through the investigation and adjudication process—not that the
prescribed sentence be meted out after an authoritative determination of guilt.
In the case of a large urban misdemeanor court system, such as New York
City, Kohler-Hausmann identified a system that had a goal of establishing a
“managerial model” of “social control”—not an “adjudicative” model, like
with felonies, which focused on determining guilt and an appropriate
sentence.235 Natapoff emphasizes an even more sinister goal of the system—
revenue generation by payment of fees and fines—as well as the more
mundane use of misdemeanors as a measure of police “productivity.”236
While the unstated goals of the misdemeanor system seem foreign to the
traditional vision of criminal justice, so too do other aspects of the process.
Most significant are Natapoff’s observations that the system often acts in a
lawless manner without concern for the requirement of evidence of guilt.237
With respect to lawlessness, she notes a “cultural disregard for the rule of
law” in a system that “quietly tolerat[es] abuses of power by unaccountable
local officials” who simply ignore legal constraints.238 One example she uses
is a practice of the Baltimore police department to routinely arrest individuals
for “loitering” despite knowing that the conduct leading to the arrest cannot
satisfy all the elements of the offense.239 Often, unrepresented defendants
will plead guilty even if their conduct would not meet the elements, thereby
avoiding the provocation of the prosecution and the costs of litigation.240
Since the “process is the punishment” in misdemeanorland, one might
think that observations about the form of substantive criminal law have little
2006/09/25/nyregion/25courts.html [https://perma.cc/ELQ6-QHP2]; Lauren Rosenthal, How
Does NY Go About Turning a Regular Person into a Judge?, N. COUNTRY PUB. RADIO (Apr.
12, 2018), https://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/35988/2018412/how-doesny-go-about-turning-a-regular-person-into-a-judge [https://perma.cc/W6GA-X76R]. The
availability of legal representation is also undoubtedly diminished in smaller communities.
One of Natapoff’s claims seems to hold true no matter the jurisdiction: the excessive use of
the criminal sanction to address all societal problems, no matter the blameworthiness or
harmfulness.
234. See generally FEELEY, supra note 110.
235. The three most significant characteristics of the managerial model were: (1) its aim
of “marking” defendants by putting arrests and convictions on their records so that they could
be tracked and later controlled; (2) putting up “procedure hassles” to test the “rule-abiding
propensities” of the marked individuals (e.g., appearing in court); and (3) “performance” in
place of a sentence, meaning “the set of activities the defendant is instructed by the court or
prosecution to undertake,” such as drug treatment (also aimed at testing rule-abidingness).
KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 28, at 21.
236. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 9, 17.
237. Id. at 191.
238. Id. at 206–07.
239. Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1359 (discussing that Baltimore police often ignore the
statutory element of obstructing another person’s movement).
240. Id. at 1359–60; see also NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 5 (calling this “meet em and plead
em”).
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(or at least greatly diminished) relevance for the study of that system.241
Moreover, if lawlessness is one of the central features242 of this system, then
an improvement in the way the laws are written would seem to be a waste of
time. However, even if one claims that rampant lawlessness and disregard
of the substantive criminal law is an endemic feature of the misdemeanor
system, there is still something worse than lawlessness. This is de facto
lawlessness with the technical veneer of lawfulness—textually sanctioned ad
hoc decision-making by officials. In such a state of affairs, one cannot even
appeal to a higher adjudicative body with a claim of lawlessness; substantive
criminal law that is overly broad and which lacks minimal constraints on
adjudicators (especially culpability requirements) comes close to this.
Thus, Natapoff accepts that one aspect of the pathologies of
misdemeanorland is indeed directly related to offense definition practices:
[T]he specific content of codes do not meaningfully constrain law
enforcement, and [] resulting convictions therefore lack the legal
legitimacy that codified law provides. Police are not strongly bound by
codified requirements in loitering, trespassing, and disturbing the peace
statutes . . . because those statutes cover wide swaths of innocuous
behavior . . . .243

Here, she expressly relies on the work of William Stuntz mentioned earlier,
in which he claims that overly broad offense definitions effectively
241. One detects that Kohler-Hausmann and Natapoff diverge on this point. KohlerHausmann, a sociologist as well as a legal scholar, appears more strongly committed to the
claim that law in general—both substantive and procedural—is a distraction. As she
concludes, the “most important lesson” to draw from her study of New York City’s
misdemeanor system is that “approaches that tinker with legal process, or even substantive
criminal law reforms, are only capable of reaching a limited set of issues.” Issa KohlerHausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 618 (2014).
Both substantive and procedural rules are “simply the tools available in the contested and
always-underspecified endeavor of social control,” and therefore, the solution must be a
political decision to rethink the use of criminal law as a mechanism of social control with
respect to misdemeanor-type conduct. Id. at 653, 692. In her book that followed the previous
article, Kohler-Hausmann continues this theme, stating that constitutional prohibitions on
vague offenses and status offenses “do not in practice seriously constrain the power of the
police and prosecutors to control people.” KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 28, at 259–60; see
also Charlie Gerstein & J. J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV.
F. 268, 270 (2015) (“[C]riminal law process costs essentially decouple statutory discretion
from actual police behavior, rendering the debate about statutory language largely moot.”).
As we will see below, Natapoff believes that substantive criminal law plays more of an
important role. See infra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
242. In misdemeanorland, Natapoff claims that “legal rules are openly ignored,” as “speed
and informality are the norm.” NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 191–92. She uses as examples the
chief judge of South Carolina openly instructing state magistrates to ignore Sixth Amendment
law due to lack of “resources,” as well as a New York defendant’s conviction (seven times)
for violating a loitering offense that had been declared unconstitutional. Id. at 192. “Such
lawlessness,” she concludes, is “a key characteristic of the petty-offense process.” Id.
243. Natapoff, supra note 30, at 1360. She does think substantive criminal law can work
as a limiter: “By contrast, when codes work properly, statutory constraints have outcomedeterminative force. For example, and in better keeping with the legality ideal, the statutory
definition of ‘honest services’ has become an important limitation on the government’s ability
to use the mail fraud statute to prosecute corruption.” Id. at 1359.
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“delegate[] power to law enforcement to define how the law is applied in
practice,” especially in the context of plea bargaining “against [a] backdrop
of unlimited potential liability.”244 And part of the overbreadth problem,
Natapoff notes, is “weak culpability requirements.”245
Now one can begin to see how the form of local criminal law described
earlier has relevance for the misdemeanor literature. Archaic local criminal
law, with its panoply of strict liability offenses, works to add to overbreadth
and to increase the size of the “menu” of options for prosecutors to use when
extracting pleas.246 If lawlessness is a problem in misdemeanorland, then
local criminal misdemeanors compound the problem. They effectively
authorize through offense definition what a lawless official would seek to do
via illegal means. Police, prosecutors, and judges need not ignore a mental
element in defiance of the law if it is absent from the ordinance’s text. In
that case, they are just playing by the rules.
B. Democratization
The phenomenon of harmful asymmetry between state and local criminal
offense drafting helps to inform a second scholarly conversation: the recent
movement to democratize criminal justice. In a 2017 symposium held by
Northwestern University Law Review, nineteen scholars signed on to a white
paper with recommendations for criminal justice reform to address the
contemporary crisis of racialized mass incarceration.247 Joshua Kleinfeld,
writing a “manifesto” for the entire group, draws a contrast between “two
visions of criminal justice”:
On one side are those who think the root of the present crisis is the outsized
influence of the American public—a violent, vengeful, stupid, uninformed,
racist, indifferent, or otherwise wrongheaded American public—and the
solution is to place control over criminal justice in the hands of officials
and experts. On the other side are those who think the root of the present
crisis is a set of bureaucratic attitudes, structures, and incentives divorced
from the American public’s concerns and sense of justice, and the solution
is to make criminal justice more community focused and responsive to lay
influences.248

244. Id. at 1358 (citing Stuntz, supra note 24, at 506).
245. Id. at 1359. She also notes that localities contribute to overcriminalization in general
(in terms of the punishment of too much conduct). NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 193 (arguing
that many misdemeanors punish conduct that is not sufficiently “bad, dangerous, or
blameworthy”).
246. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548 (2004) (“Most bodies of substantive law define citizens’
obligations. Criminal law is different. Its primary role is not to define obligations, but to
create a menu of options for prosecutors.”).
247. See generally Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at 1693.
248. Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
1367, 1376 (2017).
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This is the “conflict of visions,” a conflict between “bureaucratic
professionalization” and “democratization”; the democratizers’ position is
obviously the latter.249
The phenomenon unearthed by this Article, harmful asymmetry,
represents a mismatch between the superior product of a large state
legislature informed by the expertise of the ALI and the inferior product of a
smaller local board or council potentially because of incompetence or the
deliberate overbroadening of criminal law. If one accepts that localities are
understood to better capture “lay influences” than states and that archaic
offense drafting is inferior to modern offense drafting, then the tension with
Kleinfeld’s statement should be clear: harmful asymmetry shows that when
the lay public is left to its own devices, uninformed or unrestrained by expert
influence, it is either “stupid” and “uninformed” (if archaic local offenses are
the result of incompetence), or it is “violent” and “vengeful” (if they are the
result of deliberate overbroadening).250 Harmful asymmetry is evidence in
favor of the claims about the public that the democratizers reject. But is it
true that the democratizers would accept that localities are more democratic
(or at least better capture lay values) than states? And would they accept that
the advances of modern offense drafting are actually an “advance”?
If we turn back to Kleinfeld’s description of the two camps in his
manifesto, there is no explicit reference to local governments;251 moreover,
these entities are largely absent from the discussion of the policy proposals
that follow.252 However, there are hints throughout the democratization
volume that a “community-focused” criminal justice system incorporates an
implicit subsidiarity-type principle that smaller governmental entities are
preferable.253 Most significant is Kleinfeld’s description of the “democracy”
that the democratizers aim to maximize.254 This conception of democracy

249. All nineteen authors at the symposium signed on to a similarly phrased claim: “[T]he
root of the crisis is a set of bureaucratic attitudes, structures, and incentives divorced from the
American public’s concerns and sense of justice, and the solution is to make criminal justice
more community-focused and responsive to lay influences.” Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at
1694.
250. Kleinfeld, supra note 248, at 1376; see also id. at 1397–98 (“[James] Whitman views
the American public as, above all, violent; [John] Langbein views the American public as,
above all, stupid; and [David] Garland views the American public as, above all, racist. Each
traces the American criminal system’s dysfunctions to the toxic combination of popular rule
with a bad populace, and each turns to bureaucratic governance as a solution. They are far
from alone in this: versions of their views can be heard in the work of Michelle Alexander,
Michael Tonry, Nicola Lacey, and many, many others, both scholarly and popular. The view
is so often and so casually repeated that it has become the dominant narrative of the criminal
justice crisis in American intellectual life.” (footnotes omitted)).
251. See generally id.
252. Notable exceptions are the discussion of prosecutorial elections, civilian review
boards to control the police, and the size of the jury venire. See generally Kleinfeld et al.,
supra note 32.
253. Consider the favorable reference to William Stuntz’s claim that “criminal justice
should generally be in the hands of local neighborhoods.” Kleinfeld, supra note 248, at 1403
n.122 (citing Stuntz, supra note 24, at 520–23).
254. Id. at 1390.
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seeks to enhance citizen participation (among other values as well),255 with
participation, meaning self-government through majoritarian decisionmaking.256 Whether or not smaller, local governments will further these aims
is a central question of political theory that may never be resolved. Kleinfeld,
though, suggests that at least the participatory aspect of his theory of
democracy is enhanced by smaller entities. He states approvingly that
“participatory democracy captures core elements of democratic practice . . .
[including] direct rule in local settings (both governmental and
nongovernmental).”257
Consider also Rick Bierschbach’s piece in the same symposium
volume.258 Like the other democratizers, Bierschbach’s preference for local
control over criminal law enforcement is explicit,259 as is increased local
control of adjudication by jury participation.260 Less clear is the place of
local legislatures and the substantive criminal law they create. However,
Bierschbach does mention approvingly that just as localities have the bulk of
enforcement responsibilities, they also “pass and enforce their own
codes.”261 Local criminal law, then, appears to be included within his larger
endorsement of the benefits of a fragmented system:
The benefits of this structure are not only—or even primarily—in guarding
against governmental abuse. They also rest on broadly democratic
concepts like representativeness, deliberation, and self-determination. . . .
[F]ragmentation provides multiple nodes of input that allow communities
and neighborhoods to tailor on-the-ground criminal justice to their unique

255. Id. at 1390–95 (noting other values, like government responsiveness to lay values over
those of bureaucratic experts, deliberation (meaning a communicative process by which
culture is formed), and freedom as nondomination (through the rule of law and
constitutionalism)).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1390. Later he writes that in the democratizers’ democracy, “criminal law and
procedure . . . is substantially given into the hands of local communities as an instrument of
collective self-determination and cultural self-creation.” Id. at 1397.
258. See generally Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the
Constitutional Law of Punishment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2017).
259. Id. at 1446. Note the emphasis on enforcement and adjudication. The legislature is
not mentioned but police, judges, prosecutors, and jurors are. Id. at 1446–47 (“That
enforcement apparatus includes thousands of counties and municipalities, several thousand
prosecutors’ offices employing tens of thousands of prosecutors, and more than twelve
thousand police departments employing hundreds of thousands of officers. It also includes
thousands of local courts, judges, jails and prisons, parole and probation officers, and everyday
citizens who interact (as jurors or otherwise) with the system on a daily basis.”); see also
Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at 1700 (calling for civilian review boards to “advise police
departments and liaise between police departments and local communities”); Jocelyn
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2017) (stating that cop-watching is an example of “contestation
[which] display[s] a faith in local democracy as a tool of responsive criminal justice”).
260. Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at 1697 (“All juries . . . should be drawn from within
the immediate, local community in which the crime was committed . . . .”).
261. Bierschbach, supra note 258, at 1446.
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needs and reconcile competing values and priorities in their own
ways . . . .262

This defense of localism is a combination of a number of different arguments,
all of which would appear to justify devolution of control over substantive
criminal law to smaller and smaller governmental entities.263 Overall, it
would not be a stretch to posit that the democratizers have, at least in
principle, a fondness for local criminal law.
But what about the second assumption: would democratizers accept that
modern offense drafting is superior to archaic offense drafting? I believe the
answer is a qualified yes. The yes must be qualified because, while the
democratizers say little about offense definitions, they explicitly incorporate
the views of someone who said quite a bit: William Stuntz.264 In saying that
Stuntz would have been “one of us,” for example, Kleinfeld cites to one of
his claims about offense definitions: “common law mens rea standards,
because of their moralistic and open-ended character, open up a necessary
space for nontechnical argumentation about culpability and equity in
criminal justice trials.”265 Stuntz’s basic point was that the jury should be
able to consider moral blameworthiness when it considered culpability and
not simply intentionality with respect to bodily movements and risk

262. Id. He calls this the “optimist’s vision” of fragmentation, but one should conclude
that he himself shares that vision with respect to local criminlizaion. Later, in the section on
“Reforms,” Biershbach writes that “[g]reater attention to the values (but not the doctrine) of
federalism and its close cousin localism could likewise help,” and he explicitly references
local legislative power. Id. at 1452.
263. Here we see a concern for liberty, political participation, and experimentation by
different jurisdictions. These arguments are also commonly used to justify federalism. See
Brenner M. Fissell, Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Law, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 489,
521 (2017) (listing “generally accepted values of federalism,” as described by the Supreme
Court and academic commentators, to be “(1) maximization of individual liberty through
checks on government power (the ‘principal benefit’); (2) experimentation and innovation
across jurisdictions; (3) responsiveness to geographic diversity; (4) democratic participation;
(5) competition for citizens; and (6) inherent sovereignty”).
264. Kleinfeld, supra note 248, at 1403 (“Missing from this constitutional conversation, a
founding father of the democratization point of view, is Bill Stuntz. He would have been
among us had he lived.”). This invocation of Stuntz further supports the claim made above
regarding democratizers’ preference for localism. Kleinfeld, in citing to Stuntz, approvingly
notes the latter’s arguments “that criminal justice should generally be in the hands of local
neighborhoods; that, in particular, prosecutors should be elected from highly local community
units like neighborhoods rather than from large counties.” Id. at 1403 n.122.
265. Id.
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taking.266 He blamed the efforts of the ALI and its product, the MPC, for a
regime that foreclosed this consideration.267
It is not clear how much of this the democratizers would sign on to, and it
is unfair to impute to them everything Stuntz wrote in his final book about
mental elements (especially given its contestability).268 One does not find in
the democratization literature a criticism of the efforts undertaken by the
MPC drafters or of the use of precise, but thin, conceptions of mental states
such as intent. Instead, it appears that the insights of Stuntz are to be applied
266. In his last book, Stuntz made the novel claim that “[t]he law professors who wrote the
Model Penal Code helped to replace a system of legal doctrine that worked with one that
didn’t” and that “[t]he most important change” made by the drafters was a change in the
conception of mens rea. WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
194, 260 (2011). In the pre-MPC world, Stuntz argued, mens rea meant “a state of mind that
was worthy of moral blame.” Id. at 260. An example of this type of mens rea that is still in
force, he says, is “depraved heart” murder. Id. at 381 n.30. A case that, for Stuntz, exemplified
this halcyon past era is Justice Robert Jackson’s famous opinion in Morissette, where a strict
liability federal theft statute was interpreted to have an implicit knowledge mens rea with
respect to the claim of right to the stolen property. Id. at 261–62. The MPC drafters, as we
saw, aimed at eliminating mental elements like “depraved heart” (or “malice aforethought”)
because they were confusing. See supra Part II.A. Their replacement—the requirement of
“intent” for most criminal laws—is the rather thin requirement that the defendant “intended
his physical acts,” which for Stuntz does insufficient work in delineating between conduct that
is worthy of criminal punishment and that which is not. STUNTZ, supra, at 260, 262.
267. STUNTZ, supra note 266, at 260.
268. Two important book reviews written immediately following the publication of The
Collapse of American Criminal Justice both take Stuntz to task for his observations about the
MPC’s efforts to reform the concept of culpability. Robert Weisberg observes:
[O]ne target of Stuntz’s wrath is the professionalized expert wisdom of the
academics who created the Model Penal Code (MPC) . . . . Although the MPC
purports to disdain strict liability crimes, it enables the creation of proxies for them
by its hypertechnical, cognitively based definition of mens rea, which drains
criminal law of its authority to condemn. There is thus a non sequitur in Stuntz’s
reading of Morissette, because the evil denounced in Justice Jackson’s opinion—
strict liability—is rejected in Stuntz’s enemy, the MPC. Requiring knowledge in a
theft case is hardly inconsistent with the MPC’s use of arguably technical mens rea
terms.
Robert Weisberg, Crime and Law: An American Tragedy, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1425, 1444
(2012) (citation and footnote omitted). Here is Stephen J. Schulhofer:
As part of his skepticism toward elitist reform, Stuntz argues in The Collapse that
“[t]he law professors who wrote the Model Penal Code helped to replace a system
of legal doctrine that worked with one that didn’t.”
...
In any case, there can be no doubt about the work of “[t]he law professors who
wrote the Model Penal Code.” The Code launched “a frontal attack on absolute or
strict liability” and replaced loose concepts like “general intent”—often read to
require no moral blame—with carefully defined mental elements. It also created a
robust presumption that we must, if possible, interpret penal statutes to require a
mental state with clear-cut moral content—at a minimum a “conscious[] disregard[]
[of] a substantial and unjustified risk [of harm] . . . . involv[ing] a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct [of] a law-abiding person.”
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1061–62 (2013) (alteration in original) (citations and footnotes omitted)
(first quoting Stuntz, supra note 266, at 194; then quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmt. 1
(AM. L. INST. 1985); and then quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (3) (AM. L. INST.
1962)).
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as a supplement to, not a replacement of, MPC drafting methods. Thus, a
proposal in the democratization white paper is that “[a]ll crimes carrying a
maximum sentence of more than six months should require a showing of
moral blameworthiness, where ‘moral blameworthiness’ entails, at a
minimum, disregard for the rights or welfare of others or intent to violate the
law.”269
Because of all this, I return to my conclusion that the democratization
movement is not opposed to modern offense-drafting practices; there is
nothing that scholars in the movement would find objectionable about
element analysis or about precise culpability standards working to determine
liability in conjunction with the new “blameworthiness” element.
This, then, is why I believe harmful asymmetry is an example of one
phenomenon in American criminal justice that cuts against claims of the
democratization movement. The movement appears to claim, both explicitly
and through its implicit subsidiarity principle, that local governments will be
better sources of lay values by which criminal justice can be guided. But
local governments, as we have seen, often produce substantive criminal law
that is drafted more poorly than is state criminal law.270 Expert bureaucrats
can be credited with the improvements made in the latter, while their absence
may be blamed for the problems of the former. And if it is not a lack of
expertise that results in the condition of local criminal law (incompetence),
then it may be deliberate broadening. The lay public, at the smaller
institutional level where lay influences are most influential, seems to be
“stupid” or “vengeful”—claims rejected by the democratizers.271 Ironically,
it may also be that, using the doctrinal tools of mens rea presumptions and
state-law preemption, expert bureaucrats in the judiciary are best situated to
ameliorate the problems created by archaic local offenses promulgated
within a modern code state.272
269. Kleinfeld et al., supra note 32, at 1698. This could be incorporated either “as a
component of mens rea, a separate element of the offense, an affirmative defense, or in some
other fashion,” so long as it is a jury question. Id.
270. See supra Part III.C.
271. This claim about “lay leniency” has come under a broader attack. In an important new
article, John Rappaport marshals social science data to rebut the argument that the American
public “hold[s] relatively lenient attitudes toward criminal punishment.” John Rappaport,
Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 732 (2020);
id. at 767 (“As it turns out, all three of the national studies suggest the public is at least slightly
more punitive than the courts.”).
272. Consider how this doctrine of mens rea presumption interacts with a harmful
asymmetry between local and state law. This doctrine, when it applies, is ameliorative of the
harm: it results in a judicial rewriting of an archaic local offense to look more like a modern
state offense analogue by the grafting on of a mens rea requirement. See, e.g., City of
Englewood v. Hammes, 671 P.2d 947, 948 & n.1, 952 (Colo. 1983) (interpreting the local
offense of “interfer[ing] with or hinder[ing] [a police officer] in the discharge of his duty” to
require mens rea despite the textual absence of a mental element (quoting a city of Englewood
ordinance)). Preemption—the doctrine that displaces local laws with state laws—can be
similarly ameliorative. See, e.g., State v. Crawley, 447 A.2d 565, 570 & n.4 (N.J. 1982)
(holding that an archaic-type local loitering ordinance punishing “remaining idle in essentially
one place . . . spending time idly, loafing or walking about aimlessly, [or] . . . ‘hanging
around’” was field preempted by state law, which required culpability, noting the goal of a
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C. Localism Reappraised
As we come to the end of our analysis of the implications of the
phenomenon of harmful local-state offense-drafting asymmetry for the
misdemeanor and democratization literatures, we come full circle and return
to the dilemma of localism—the joint opportunity and threat presented by
devolution of power. Recall the summary of the dilemma given by Roderick
Hills: “lovers of local government . . . are going to have to make a tough
choice between direct political participation that local governments facilitate
and the social inequality and parochialism that local governments also seem
to promote.”273 Indeed, the dilemma seems most consequential when the
local power being exercised is the power to criminalize conduct. Natapoff
and the democratizers, though, fall squarely on the prolocalism side.
Natapoff writes of reform such that “many misdemeanor changes will of
necessity be bottom-up, driven by local residents, advocates, and public
officials.”274 This is a cause for hope, though, and not concern: “The beauty
of localism, however, is that it offers enormous room for creativity and
experimentation; each jurisdiction can implement change in its own ways,
given its own population, history, needs, and resources.”275 In reviewing
Natapoff’s claims discussing this experimentation approvingly, Judge
Stephanos Bibas adds that localism also allows for “room for variation”
between different communities that may have different views about criminal
justice and “social order.”276 Additionally, recall Rick Bierschbach’s
conclusion that “[t]he benefits of this [localist] structure . . . rest on broadly
democratic concepts like representativeness, deliberation, and selfdetermination.”277 Similarly, he writes, “[g]reater attention to the values . . .
“comprehensive system of criminal law” in the state (alteration in original) (quoting Newark,
N.J., REV. ORDINANCES tit. 17, ch. 2, § 14 (1966), repealed by Newark, N.J., Rev. Ordinance
Repealing in Its Entirety Revised Ordinances of the City of Newark, County of Essex, Title
XX, Chapter 2, Section 14, Loitering (June 3, 2009)). The ameliorative effects of the doctrines
of mens rea presumption and preemption are the product of judicial experts, not lay values.
273. Hills Jr., supra note 6, at 2011–12. For an excellent summary of this debate, to which
I am indebted, see Barron, supra note 6, at 2330–32.
274. NATAPOFF, supra note 3, at 226.
275. Id. at 226–27 (“In the misdemeanor world, every . . . municipality can launch its own
experiment.”); see also id. at 245 (“Municipalities can unilaterally improve their practices
whenever they choose, with immediate effect on the lives of local residents.”); id. (“Seen
through this lens, the misdemeanor system is a place of hope.”); Bibas, supra note 112, at
1041 (“Natapoff recognizes the need for localism and in places comes close to embracing it.
Our country is vast, and our criminal-justice systems are many, fragmented, and varied.
Though many scholars instinctively distrust localities, Natapoff sees their bottom-up role as
both inevitable and desirable, letting them try out creative experiments . . . .”).
276. Bibas, supra note 112, at 1041 (“Some communities prize orderly public spaces and
are willing to trade away more liberty. Others are more relaxed about social disorder and
disruption. The genius of American federalism (and localism) is that the police and
prosecutors in each community can calibrate the level of enforcement to their communities.
Communities can govern themselves, deliberating on and making their own tradeoffs. There
is not a single Platonic ideal, but a range of approaches. And democracy is not static, but
adapts these approaches over time to each community’s needs and in light of what it learns
from experimenting.”).
277. Bierschbach, supra note 258, at 1446.
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[of] localism could . . . help,” and suggests that devolution of legislative
power could “enhance representativeness.”278 “City councils,” Bierschbach
argues, “could be given real power to craft their own substantive criminal
codes in response to community concerns . . . even if far-flung state
legislators disagree.”279
Scholars of federalism will recognize a number of familiar arguments in
the above claims (localist and federalist arguments usually mirror each
other).280 Natapoff is explicitly invoking the famous vision of smaller
governmental units as “laboratories of experimentation,”281 while Bibas adds
an often used argument that devolution enables different lawmaking
jurisdictions to have their own moral viewpoints instantiated in law.282 The
thrust of Bierschbach’s localist argument is, like the others, a well-known
claim that power devolution enhances democratic values (especially political
participation).283
The phenomenon of harmful asymmetry should concern proponents of
localism; it is evidence that in the context of criminal offense drafting, the
threat posed by localism is greater than the opportunity.284 Perhaps it could
be true that localities could act as experimental laboratories in the benefits of
different ways of writing criminal laws; but harmful asymmetry shows that
without skilled “scientists” to help localities set up and learn from their
experiments, the laboratory is likely to learn nothing or to harm. Perhaps it
is true that different localities should be able to reflect different visions of
morality in their criminal law; harmful asymmetry, though, shows that this
allows for localities to deliberately broaden offenses through the widespread
use of strict liability. And finally, perhaps it is true that smaller governmental
278. Id. at 1452.
279. Id.
280. Since federalism is now “discussed in terms of normative concerns, but federalism’s
values are not distinctively associated with the states,” the result is that “the case for federalism
tends to resemble the case for localism.” Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?”:
Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303,
1311–12 (1994).
281. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
282. For elaborations of the experimentation rationale, see, for example, Barry Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 404–05 (1997); Susan R. Klein, IndependentNorm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1541, 1541–42 (2002). For discussion
of the value of smaller jurisdictional boundaries in order to allow for concentrated groups of
people with similar moral viewpoints to create their own law, see Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 8 (1988) (arguing that federalism allows for the “type of social and political climate
[citizens] prefer”); see also Friedman, supra, at 401–02 (calling this a “cultural diversity”
argument).
283. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist
Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888, 889 (2006) (arguing that “federalism itself is an individual
right because it provides an accessible mechanism by which laypeople can influence the scope
of their rights”); Merritt, supra note 282, at 7–8 (arguing that political involvement engendered
by smaller jurisdictions “trains citizens in the techniques of democracy, fosters accountability
among elected representatives, and enhances voter confidence in the democratic process”).
284. Again, this Article does not consider a context in which a locality drafted modern
offenses in an archaic code state, as such an example has not yet been found.
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units allow for greater democratic participation in the creation of criminal
law; but harmful asymmetry suggests that such participation, when
unmediated by expertise, results in a retrograde form of criminal law.
CONCLUSION
More scholarly attention must be paid to the vast body of criminal law that
local governments create. This Article has assessed one important dimension
of this local criminalization: the form in which localities draft their offenses.
As illustrated above, offense drafting at this governmental level often
employs an archaic model, with little concern given to culpability
requirements or the facilitation of element analysis. The advances of modern
drafting are either ignored or deliberately rejected. This seems to be
especially problematic when the locality is promulgating offenses in a state
that has consciously reformed its code in light of the ALI’s
recommendations—here, home rule creates an asymmetry between local and
state criminal law and thwarts modernization efforts. These claims weigh
against accepting the optimism, stated by many scholars and reformers, that
increased localism will mitigate problems in the criminal justice system more
than it will aggravate them.

